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Screening Out Innovation:  
The Merits of Meritless Litigation 
ALEXANDER A. REINERT* 
Courts and legislatures often conflate meritless and frivolous cases when 
balancing the desire to keep courthouse doors open to novel or unlikely claims 
against the concern that entertaining ultimately unsuccessful litigation will prove 
too costly for courts and defendants. Recently, significant procedural and 
substantive barriers to civil litigation have been informed by judicial and 
legislative assumptions about the costs of entertaining meritless and frivolous 
litigation. The prevailing wisdom is that eliminating meritless and frivolous claims 
as early in a case’s trajectory as possible will focus scarce resources on the truly 
meritorious cases, thereby ensuring that available remedies are properly 
distributed to deserving plaintiffs. 
Frivolous and meritless litigation are not the same, however. Frivolous claims 
are easier to identify at the outset of litigation because they rest on unrecognizable 
legal theories or fantastical factual allegations. More importantly, meritless 
litigation has a distinct and identifiable value that is obscured by conflating 
meritless claims with frivolous ones. Unlike frivolous litigation, meritless litigation 
can bring to light facts that may lead to systematic reform (even where no legal 
cause of action lies), lead to legal innovation by announcing new interpretations of 
common law and statutory and constitutional texts, and pave the way for future 
changes in the law. Recognizing the value of meritless litigation and distinguishing 
meritless from frivolous cases therefore raises questions about the recent barriers 
that have been imposed to civil litigation. Taking the value of meritless litigation 
into account is essential if we are to strike the correct balance between the costs 
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INTRODUCTION 
The language of legal innovation is often expressed in biological terms. Thus, 
law is said to “evolve,” according to judges and commentators.1 Similarly, law 
“adapts” or makes “adaptations” to new contexts and circumstances.2 There are 
some doctrines, like the Eighth Amendment, that are judged specifically according 
to “evolving standards.”3 These words have a biologic, if not progressive, tilt—in 
the life sciences, evolution and adaptation are the words most commonly used to 
describe the change in species over time. 
But although the law has embraced this metaphor of biology, it has not 
embraced a critical aspect of evolutionary theory: the value of failure. As Stephen 
Jay Gould famously wrote, “[H]onorable errors do not count as failures in science, 
but as seeds for progress in the quintessential activity of correction.”4 In biology, it 
is understood that innovation is the product of many errors or mistakes. With their 
view from a multimillennial perspective, paleontologists in particular might note 
that life is principally a story of extinction: 99% or more of all species that ever 
                                                                                                                 
 
 1. Indeed, the use of the term “evolve” with respect to law is so common as to be clichéd. 
According to a search of the JLR database, the word “law” and “evolve” or “evolution” occur 
within three words of each other in more than 10,000 articles. According to a search of the 
“ALLFEDS” database, 783 federal opinions contain that language (including 33 Supreme Court 
opinions). And 1072 state court opinions contain that formulation. 
 2. Like evolve or evolution, the word “law” appears quite often accompanied by 
“adapt” or “adaptation.” There are 4169 journal articles, 148 federal court opinions 
(including 24 Supreme Court decisions), and 467 state court opinions in which the word 
“law” occurs within three words of “adapt” or “adaptation.” 
 3. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion) (introducing term 
“evolving standards of decency”); see also Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102–03 (1976) 
(applying Trop in context of prisoner medical care); Alexander A. Reinert, Eighth 
Amendment Gaps: Can Conditions of Confinement Litigation Benefit from Proportionality 
Theory?, 36 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 53, 64–66 (2009) (describing development of doctrine). 
 4. STEPHEN JAY GOULD, LEONARDO’S MOUNTAIN OF CLAMS AND THE DIET OF WORMS: 
ESSAYS ON NATURAL HISTORY 163 (1998). 
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roamed the earth are no longer extant.5 Traits that are maladaptive in one context 
can become advantageous in another.6 
In the law, however, value is generally measured by outcome. A case is 
successful and therefore valuable if it alters the status quo with respect to the 
relationship between plaintiff and defendant (e.g., payment of money or an 
agreement to do or cease to do something).7 If it does not, it is easy to write off as a 
failure and simply a burden to the legal system. My project in this Article is to 
show that this assumption is costly and wrong. It imposes costs because 
assumptions about the burden of what is called “meritless” litigation have led to the 
adoption of legal rules that inhibit innovation by treating all unsuccessful litigation 
as presumptively frivolous. It is wrong because even patently unsuccessful 
litigation can contribute to positive legal change. Indeed, as in the context of 
evolution, such litigation may be necessary to accomplish legal innovation. 
Take our modern understanding of the constitutional limitations on sex 
classifications, informed by a series of cases that began with Reed v. Reed and 
culminated in Craig v. Boren.8 By the end of this series, one could make two 
observations: first, intentional sex classifications would be judged under 
“intermediate scrutiny”; and second, the State would have more leeway to make 
classifications based on “real” and not stereotyped differences. But one would not 
be able to understand this framework without both the meritorious and meritless 
cases. As just one example, because of an unsuccessful constitutional challenge, we 
know that a “real” difference between sexes that can justify a facial sex-based 
classification is past discrimination against women in the workplace; because of a 
successful challenge, we know that generalizations about the bonds formed by 
mothers and fathers with their children cannot justify a facial classification.9 As 
regards innovation in the law, both principles have value.  
                                                                                                                 
 
 5. See Stephen Jay Gould, The Golden Rule: A Proper Scale for Our Environmental 
Crisis, in EIGHT LITTLE PIGGIES 41, 46 (1993). 
 6. In other words, degrees of maladaptation are relative. Traits that are neutral in one 
context can be adaptive or maladaptive in another. See generally Bernard J. Crespi, The 
Evolution of Maladaptation, 84 HEREDITY 623 (2000). 
 7. Some will argue that even cases that result in the payment of money may be 
frivolous or meritless. For reasons that I explain below, this Article rests on the assumption 
that a case that results in a positive outcome for the plaintiff is meritorious. See infra notes 
41–46 and accompanying text. 
 8. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (striking down statute that provided 
different drinking ages for men and women); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 
(1975) (striking down Social Security Act provision that differentiated based on sex of 
wage-earning spouse); Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975) (upholding preferences 
for women in Navy’s promotion system); Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974) 
(upholding classification based on pregnancy in California’s disability insurance program); 
Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974) (upholding state property tax exemption for widows 
but not widowers); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (striking down provision of 
military benefits statute that disfavored spouses of women service members); Reed v. Reed, 
404 U.S. 71 (1971) (rejecting sex classification in estate proceedings); see also Califano v. 
Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977) (sustaining preference for women in calculation of social 
security benefits). 
 9. Compare Webster, 430 U.S. 313, with Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979). 
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There will be an immediate rejoinder, informed by a legitimate concern about 
resources. Our procedural regime relies on a number of filters that funnel an ever-
narrowing set of cases toward trial: pre-answer screening, pre-discovery motion 
practice, and summary judgment are the most prominent examples. Meritless cases 
that remain in the system impose burdens on both defendants and courts that we 
must consider as we arrive at the proper standard for each filter.10 If one only 
focuses on the burdens of adjudicating weak or meritless cases, however, it is easy 
to lose sight of the reality that even ultimately unsuccessful cases can offer benefits 
to the legal system. Arriving at the right standard for each procedural filter requires 
accounting for both the burdens and potential benefits of litigation with varying 
merit. Academics, judges, and legislators have single-mindedly concentrated only 
on burdens.11 This Article shifts the focus to more completely address the benefits 
of meritless litigation. 
The need for intervention is most critical when policing the often-ignored line 
between frivolous and meritless litigation. Frivolous litigation is one of the few 
problems that invites universal scorn by legislators, judges, and academics.12 But 
this superficial agreement obscures an important question: Just what is “frivolous” 
litigation? And, relatedly, how is frivolous litigation different from meritless 
litigation? The failure to precisely answer this latter question makes it too easy to 
conflate the categories and therefore too easy to see both kinds of cases as equally 
valueless. After all, if one contemplates only the burdens of unsuccessful litigation, 
there is little if any difference between frivolous and meritless claims. As I argue in 
this Article, however, meritless litigation, doomed as it may be, has much more to 
offer the legal system. 
Legislators, judges, and academics have paid varying attention to the question of 
what constitutes a frivolous case and how it might be distinguished from a meritless 
one. Congress has tended to treat meritless and frivolous cases as substantially 
overlapping categories of the same subset. The Prison Litigation Reform Act 
(PLRA), for example, targets both meritless and frivolous litigation as equally 
problematic.13 Similarly, the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) 
treats abusive, frivolous, and meritless lawsuits together as equally damaging to the 
public, the courts, investors, and issuers of securities.14 Many states have 
introduced legislation targeting meritless and frivolous litigation as well.15 Thus, 
                                                                                                                 
 
 10. See Lonny S. Hoffman, Burn Up the Chaff with Unquenchable Fire: What Two 
Doctrinal Intersections Can Teach Us About Judicial Power over Pleadings, 88 B.U. L. 
REV. 1217, 1218 (2008). 
 11. For examples from academic writing, see generally infra notes 22–25. For examples 
from judicial opinions, see infra Parts II.A.1 and II.A.3. The Prison Litigation Reform Act 
and the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act are prime examples of the legislative focus 
on the burdens of meritless litigation. See infra Parts II.B.1 & II.B.2. 
 12. As Suja Thomas writes, “It seems that everyone is against frivolous cases. How can 
you not be?” Suja A. Thomas, Frivolous Cases, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 633, 634 (2010). 
 13. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (2006); infra notes 138–65 and accompanying text. 
 14. The PSLRA introduced a heightened pleading requirement for securities litigation, 
among many other barriers to success. See infra Part II.B.2. 
 15. States have adopted their own versions of the PLRA, for example. See infra 
Part II.B.1. And states have attempted to stem the tide of frivolous litigation by extending 
some of the PLRA’s limitations to all “vexatious” litigants. See generally Erin Schiller & 
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for state and federal legislators, purging the judicial docket of both meritless and 
frivolous cases often is seen to advance the same goals. And most of this legislation 
does not contemplate the possibility that meritless cases make positive 
contributions to the law.16 
Similarly, judges tend to regard both frivolous and meritless cases as drags on 
the legal system, offering no offsetting benefits. Qualified immunity doctrine in 
civil rights cases has been modified to make it more difficult overall to obtain 
damages remedies against government officials, on the logic that it is necessary to 
deter frivolous or insubstantial cases.17 The Supreme Court has gradually reduced 
the availability of damages remedies against federal officials because of the 
perception that such litigation is primarily frivolous.18 More broadly, the Supreme 
Court recently adopted substantial changes to federal pleading doctrine to reduce 
the risk that litigants with frivolous and meritless claims will take advantage of the 
high cost of discovery to extract nuisance settlements from innocent defendants.19 
Similar changes have been embraced at the summary judgment stage.20 Although 
all of these changes impact meritless cases overall, and not just frivolous ones, 
courts generally justify them as necessary to deter the filing of frivolous cases.21 
And like legislators, courts rarely acknowledge any benefit from adjudicating 
meritless cases (even when such cases are resolved at an early procedural stage).  
Legal scholars have recognized that the term “frivolous” is ill-defined and that 
there are costs to failing to differentiate the frivolous from the nonfrivolous.22 But 
even so, most commentators have failed to adequately distinguish between 
frivolous and meritless cases.23 This is particularly vexing in discussions of 
                                                                                                                 
Jeffrey A. Wertkin, Note, Frivolous Filings and Vexatious Litigation, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL 
ETHICS 909 (2001) (discussing litigation introduced in California, Texas, and Hawaii). 
 16. As I discuss below, Congress could, and occasionally has, recognized the value of 
meritless cases. See, e.g., infra notes 254, 256–58 and accompanying text. 
 17. See infra Part II.A.2. 
 18. See generally Laurence H. Tribe, Death by a Thousand Cuts: Constitutional Wrongs 
Without Remedies After Wilkie v. Robbins, 2007 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 23 (arguing that Bivens 
remedy has been gradually undermined and is currently endangered). 
 19. See infra Part II.A.1. 
 20. See infra note 106 and accompanying text. 
 21. See infra notes 99–103 and accompanying text. 
 22. See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, Modeling Frivolous Suits, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 519, 520 
(1997) (“We have no . . . common agreement on what constitutes a ‘frivolous suit.”’); Sanford 
Levinson, Frivolous Cases: Do Lawyers Really Know Anything at All?, 24 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 
353, 378 (1987) (stating that it is difficult to distinguish between “weak” and “frivolous” 
cases); Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play on the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1, 81–82 (2010) (decrying lack of common definition of 
“frivolous” litigation); Deborah L. Rhode, Frivolous Litigation and Civil Justice Reform: 
Miscasting the Problem, Recasting the Solution, 54 DUKE L.J. 447, 449–50 (2004) (giving 
examples of public, judicial, and jury disagreement over what is frivolous); Thomas, supra note 
12, at 634. 
 23. See Lucian Ayre Bebchuk & Howard F. Chang, An Analysis of Fee Shifting Based on 
the Margin of Victory: On Frivolous Suits, Meritorious Suits, and the Role of Rule 11, 25 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 371, 373 (1996) (equating frivolous with non-meritorious); Geoffrey Miller, A 
Modest Proposal for Securities Fraud Pleading After Tellabs, 75 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 
1, 2012, at 93, 98; Rhode, supra note 22, at 449–50 (same); Thomas, supra note 12, at 634–35 
(recognizing vagueness of term but failing to distinguish frivolous from meritless). 
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procedural tools for filtering between frivolous, meritless, and meritorious cases.24 
As just one concrete example, in the context of qui tam litigation, commentators 
and courts alike often conflate the problem of frivolous litigation with meritless 
litigation.25 Thus, many commentators appear to assume that False Claims Act 
cases in which the Attorney General moves to dismiss or fails to intervene are both 
frivolous and meritless.26 Even critics of judicial innovations such as heightened 
pleading divide cases into two camps—the frivolous or meritless strike suit and the 
meritorious claim.27 
                                                                                                                 
 
 24. See Douglas A. Blaze, Presumed Frivolous: Application of Stringent Pleading 
Requirements in Civil Rights Litigation, 31 WM. & MARY L. REV. 935, 976–89 (1990) 
(describing various rules that filter out frivolous and meritless cases, without distinguishing 
between the two); Robert G. Bone, Plausibility Pleading Revisited and Revised: A Comment on 
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 849, 870 & n.106 (2010) (equating “truly meritless” 
with “frivolous”); Joseph A. Seiner, After Iqbal, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 179, 226 & n.354 
(2010) (conflating meritless and frivolous); A. Benjamin Spencer, Plausibility Pleading, 49 
B.C. L. REV. 431, 432, 486 (2008) (describing rules that ensure the dismissal of meritless and 
frivolous claims, without distinguishing between the two). But see Matthew Diller, Judicial 
Backlash, the ADA, and the Civil Rights Model, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 19, 20–21 
(2000) (making distinction between frivolous ADA claims and claims dismissed because of 
particular interpretation of the statute). 
 25. See John T. Boese & Beth C. McClain, Why Thompson Is Wrong: Misuse of the False 
Claims Act to Enforce the Anti-kickback Act, 51 ALA. L. REV. 1, 49 (1999) (arguing that 
frivolous suits are insufficiently filtered by the False Claims Act because the Department of 
Justice must “affirmatively move for the dismissal of meritless suits, a process that requires a 
modest commitment of prosecutorial resources”); Joan H. Krause, Regulating, Guiding, and 
Enforcing Health Care Fraud, 60 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 241, 281 (2004) (“[A] successful 
system must generate primarily meritorious suits, and weed out frivolous ones. To achieve this 
goal, the incentives must be generous enough to induce participation by insiders, yet not so 
tempting as to engender meritless suits.” (emphasis omitted) (footnote omitted)); Christopher 
W. Myers, The False Claims Act Clarification Act: An End to the FCA’s Bar on Parasitic Qui 
Tam Actions?, PROCUREMENT LAW., Spring 2009, at 7, 10 (“The infrequency of government 
dismissals under section 3730(c)(2)(A) is not for lack of frivolous FCA suits. Indeed, statistics 
published by the DOJ suggest that a large percentage of FCA suits are meritless, especially 
those in which the government declines intervention.”); Christina Orsini Broderick, Note, Qui 
Tam Provisions and the Public Interest: An Empirical Analysis, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 949, 
995 (2007) (“[T]here appears to be a significant number of frivolous qui tam actions. . . . [T]he 
fact that the Attorney General has only intervened in just over 10% of the qui tam actions filed 
with the office since 1999 shows that it is likely to be large.”); see also United States ex rel. 
Joshi v. St. Luke’s Hosp., Inc., 441 F.3d 552, 559 (8th Cir. 2006). 
 26. See, e.g., Boese & McClain, supra note 25, at 49; Myers, supra note 25, at 10. The 
decision not to intervene, however, does not necessarily reflect the Department of Justice’s 
view that the case is frivolous. See Michael Rich, Prosecutorial Indiscretion: Encouraging the 
Department of Justice to Rein In Out-of-Control Qui Tam Litigation Under the Civil False 
Claims Act, 76 U. CIN. L. REV. 1233, 1261, 1263–64 (2008) (discussing intervention decision 
and its relationship to prospect of recovery and noting that relators sometimes prevail even in 
cases in which there is no intervention). 
 27. See Christopher M. Fairman, The Myth of Notice Pleading, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 987, 
1059–60 (2003) (criticizing substance-specific heightened pleading standards on the grounds 
that they are based on anecdotes and that they may lead to the “improper dismissal of 
potentially meritorious cases”). 
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The exception to this general trend is in discussions of Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 11, which is the most recognizable tool for addressing frivolous but not 
meritless claims. In this context, Robert Bone has been a leading voice, defining a 
frivolous claim as one in which “a plaintiff files suit knowing facts that decisively 
establish little or no chance of the defendant’s objective liability on the basis of any 
of the legal theories plaintiff alleges” or “without conducting a reasonable prefiling 
investigation when such an investigation would have revealed facts establishing 
little or no chance that the defendant was actually liable on any of the legal theories 
alleged.”28 This is a useful starting point, but Bone’s definition is meant to help 
decide when a lawyer or party should be sanctioned for litigation behavior, not to 
resolve how a case should be adjudicated. Relatedly, Bone and most other 
commentators on Rule 11 standards have not sought to elaborate the value of 
adjudicating meritless cases.29 This Article articulates the values of meritless 
litigation and also frames the problem in the broader context of case disposition, 
not the Rule 11 context of sanctions. 
In Part I, I explain why, for the purpose of this Article, it is useful to have a 
modified version of Bone’s definition of a frivolous case. Because the focus of this 
Article is case disposition, not independent sanctions, I propose that our 
understanding of “frivolous” should revolve around timing and substance. By 
timing, I mean that judges should have a conception of frivolous that permits 
application at the moment of filing. By substance, I mean that our definition should 
exclude only those cases that, by their substantive claims or allegations, can safely 
be said to have a zero chance of success. If we cannot determine at filing that a case 
has a zero chance of success, then the case may be meritless or meritorious, and 
permitting the case to proceed through subsequent procedural steps (answer, 
motion practice, and possibly discovery followed by summary judgment) has the 
potential to add value to the legal system. In Part II, I turn to demonstrating the 
many ways in which legislatures and courts fail to narrowly define “frivolous,” and 
in so doing merge frivolous with meritless. My goal is to demonstrate, even to 
those readers who would adopt a different definition of “frivolous,” that legislators 
and judges have failed to clearly articulate the distinction between meritless and 
frivolous cases. 
In Part III, I explain the many ways in which nonmeritorious, but nonfrivolous 
cases can contribute to the law and how the dynamics explored in Part II undermine 
these contributions. Some meritless cases contribute by revealing facts that 
otherwise would remain private: facts that expose wrongdoing that is not 
remediable under law, facts that lead to other legal actors instituting action, and 
facts that lead to legal reform. Some meritless cases contribute by clarifying 
existing law or by announcing new legal principles. Some of these benefits have 
been recognized, at least implicitly, before. John Jeffries, for instance, has pointed 
out that qualified immunity doctrine gives courts leeway to announce new legal 
principles without holding government officials retroactively accountable.30 But 
                                                                                                                 
 
 28. Bone, supra note 22, at 531–32 (emphasis omitted). 
 29. Also writing in the context of Rule 11, Charles Yablon has offered a defense of at 
least some meritless cases. See Charles M. Yablon, The Good, the Bad, and the Frivolous 
Case: An Essay on Probability and Rule 11, 44 UCLA L. REV. 65, 94, 104–06 (1996). 
 30. See John C. Jeffries, Jr., The Right-Remedy Gap in Constitutional Law, 109 YALE 
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Jeffries has done so to defend the gap that qualified immunity creates between 
rights and remedies, not to defend the value of meritless litigation.31 And other 
scholars who have accepted the prospect that meritless cases could provide value 
that frivolous cases do not have limited their comments to the Rule 11 context and 
its potential deterrence of novel legal arguments.32 My concern here is the extent to 
which the value of meritless cases is underappreciated throughout civil litigation, as 
reflected in the legislative and judicial trends I identify in Part II. 
I briefly conclude with a discussion about what it might mean to better account 
for the distinction between meritless and frivolous litigation. In some limited 
circumstances, it should result in a wholesale revision of how we treat certain 
categories of cases, such as prisoners’ rights litigation. More broadly, however, it 
should enable us to strike the correct balance between keeping our courthouse 
doors open to potentially transformative legal claims on one hand and minimizing 
the costs of entertaining losing cases on the other. Achieving the proper balance 
will always require recalibration over time, but we cannot hope to be on the best 
path without acknowledging the potential benefits of meritless litigation. 
I. DISTINGUISHING THE FRIVOLOUS CASE 
To appreciate the value of meritless (as opposed to frivolous) claims, it is 
necessary first to have a working conception of both terms that will serve a useful 
purpose when adjudicating cases (rather than, as in the Rule 11 context, when 
assessing sanctions). A definition of frivolous and meritless that accounts for the 
value of entertaining such claims necessarily involves a consideration of the costs 
of adjudication as well. If some litigation provides no value to the legal system, 
then any judicial time spent adjudicating such claims is wasted.33 Thus, timing is a 
key component of conceptions of frivolousness and meritlessness. Of course, a 
claim’s substance also is particularly important. Some claims will be frivolous for 
obvious reasons—for example, the plaintiff who asks that the government construct 
a Statue-of-Liberty-sized statue in his likeness on Governor’s Island, valued at 
$100 billion, as a remedy for not receiving an unconditional pardon from the 
President of the United States.34 Others will be frivolous because they are based on 
a conception of the law that is both unsupported and unsupportable under any 
existing principle.35 And some claims will be frivolous because they are based on 
allegations of outlandish facts that are the stuff of science fiction.36 These examples 
                                                                                                                 
L.J. 87, 88–90 (1999). 
 31. See id. 
 32. See D. Michael Risinger, Honesty in Pleading and Its Enforcement: Some 
“Striking” Problems with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, 61 MINN. L. REV. 1, 57 
(1976); Yablon, supra note 29, at 105.  
 33. See Keith N. Hylton, When Should a Case Be Dismissed? The Economics of 
Pleading and Summary Judgment Standards, 16 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 39, 41 (2008) 
(“[E]arly dismissals, by eliminating low-merit claims before they become costly, offer 
benefits to society in comparison to late dismissals.”). 
 34. See Complaint, Hall v. Clinton, No. 1:01-cv-06218 (N.D. Ill. 2001). 
 35. See, e.g., Stanard v. Nygren, 658 F.3d 792, 794 (7th Cir. 2011) (listing “obviously 
frivolous claims” such as “something called a ‘direct action under [the] U.S. Constitution’” 
(alteration in original)). 
 36. See, e.g., Qamar v. CIA, 489 F. App’x 393, 395 (11th Cir. 2012) (finding 
2014] SCREENING OUT INNOVATION 1199 
 
should make clear that most claims can be assessed for frivolousness upon the 
filing of a complaint. As I will explain below, however, it will usually be difficult 
to say that a nonfrivolous claim is meritless at the outset of litigation; assessing the 
merit of nonfrivolous claims will often require adversarial briefing or factual 
discovery. 
A precise definition of both terms is not essential, because what is most 
important is to understand that frivolous cases may be different than meritless ones 
and that how we define the term “frivolous” reflects a value judgment about 
meritless cases. Thus, if we believe that all meritless cases are frivolous, and vice 
versa, then conflating the two kinds of cases in terms of their value to the legal 
system is unproblematic. As a formal matter, however, both courts and 
commentators resist this kind of definition. In Neitzke v. Williams,37 the Supreme 
Court rejected the contention that all complaints that failed to state a claim were 
frivolous, holding instead that a frivolous claim for the purposes of case disposition 
“lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.”38 Even though there was 
“considerable” overlap between the failure-to-state-a-claim standard and the 
frivolousness standard, “it does not follow that a complaint which falls afoul of the 
former standard will invariably fall afoul of the latter.”39 And most commentators, 
even though they may believe that meritless and frivolous claims are equally 
valueless, tend to recognize that they should be defined differently at least for the 
purpose of Rule 11 sanctions.40 
This suggests that we should have a broad taxonomy of frivolous, meritless, and 
meritorious cases, even as we recognize that there may be overlap between how we 
conceptualize the first and second categories. To start, it is useful to begin with an 
even broader division, between successful and unsuccessful cases, in which success 
is defined as the plaintiff’s recovery of something of value through litigation.41 
I assume here that “successful” cases should be neither frivolous nor meritless. 
This is a proposition that will provoke argument, for there are some who maintain 
that this assumption is false: namely that settlements are obtained for claims that 
are clearly frivolous or at least meritless and that juries may award substantial 
damages for claims that lack merit. For instance, many argue that the costs of 
discovery and the concomitant pressure on defendants to settle otherwise meritless 
suits are rampant problems.42 The expense of electronic discovery only amplifies 
                                                                                                                 
“incredible” allegations that plaintiff was sexually assaulted by prison officials so that they 
could plant drugs which would then form the basis of enhanced interrogation by the CIA); 
Cofield v. Ala. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 936 F.2d 512, 515–16 (11th Cir. 1991) (describing 
“fantastic” allegation of conspiracy by prison officials). 
 37. 490 U.S. 319 (1989). 
 38. Id. at 325.  
 39. Id. at 326. 
 40. See sources cited supra notes 22, 27–29. 
 41. This is the standard used by most empiricists to study success in litigation outcomes. 
See, e.g., Alexander A. Reinert, Measuring the Success of Bivens Litigation and Its 
Consequences for the Individual Liability Model, 62 STAN. L. REV. 809, 833 (2010); Margo 
Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1555, 1592–93 (2003); Stewart J. Schwab & 
Theodore Eisenberg, Explaining Constitutional Tort Litigation: The Influence of the Attorney 
Fees Statute and the Government as Defendant, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 719, 726–27 (1988). 
 42. See Alistair Dawson, House Bill 4 and the Future of Class Action Litigation, 
ADVOCATE (Tex.), Fall 2003, at 60, 63 (noting that “regardless of the merits,” in class action 
1200 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 89:1191 
 
this narrative.43 Others maintain that the high cost of discovery is a double-edged 
sword and can force a plaintiff with little resources to settle claims for less value 
than they are worth.44 And of course there are those who question the assertion that 
discovery abuse is pervasive and leads to an inordinate number of extortionate 
settlements.45 Indeed, much of the empirical literature suggests that discovery 
unfolds rationally, with higher costs spent on more complex cases, while most 
cases generate little in the way of discovery costs.46 
                                                                                                                 
cases, oftentimes defendants would prefer to settle than to bear the high cost of discovery); 
Cameron S. Matheson, Transvestite Cowboys, Thieving Brokers, and the Securities 
Litigation Uniform Standards Act: SLUSA’s Trap for the Unwary Plaintiff, 35 MCGEORGE L. 
REV. 121, 126 (2004) (noting that Congress believed that the high costs associated with 
discovery may allow a party with a frivolous suit to force the defendant to settle securities 
class actions); Charles Silver, Does Civil Justice Cost Too Much?, 80 TEX. L. REV. 2073, 
2093–98 (2002) (reviewing and then debunking claim that litigants use discovery tools to 
harass opponents with burdensome requests); see also Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro 
Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 268 (2004) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[D]iscovery and discovery-
related judicial proceedings take time, they are expensive, and cost and delay, or threats of 
cost and delay, can themselves force parties to settle underlying disputes.”); Blue Chip 
Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 741 (1975) (stating that expanding category of 
plaintiffs who could sue in securities litigation would encourage use of discovery for in 
terrorem increase of settlement value); In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1298 
(7th Cir. 1995) (citing Judge Friendly’s use of term “blackmail” for those settlements in 
which defendants settle weak class action claims because of risks at trial). 
 43. See Scott A. Moss, Litigation Discovery Cannot Be Optimal but Could Be Better: 
The Economics of Improving Discovery Timing in a Digital Age, 58 DUKE L.J. 889, 894 
(2009) (“[E]-discovery can cost tens or hundreds of thousands of dollars in even fairly 
typical cases . . . .”); Jessica Lynn Repa, Comment, Adjudicating Beyond the Scope of 
Ordinary Business: Why the Inaccessibility Test in Zubulake Unduly Stifles Cost-Shifting 
During Electronic Discovery, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 257, 295–96 (2004) (noting that high 
discovery costs create incentives to settle, even for meritorious suits). 
 44. See Mathias Reimann, Liability for Defective Products at the Beginning of the 
Twenty-First Century: Emergence of a Worldwide Standard?, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 751, 817 
n.351 (2003) (discussing why the high costs of discovery can work against a plaintiff); 
Meade W. Mitchell, Comment, Discovery Abuse and a Proposed Reform: Mandatory 
Disclosure, 62 MISS. L.J. 743, 744–55 (1993) (tying discovery abuse to the adversarial 
system, not to abuses solely by plaintiffs’ counsel); id. at 751 n.41 (“Each side is motivated 
to hide information, especially information or witnesses exposure of which could cause 
severe adverse consequences to the client.”). Docket congestion may also play a role in a 
plaintiff’s decision to settle. George L. Priest, Private Litigants and the Court Congestion 
Problem, 69 B.U. L. REV. 527, 543 (1989) (presenting theoretical and empirical reasons to 
believe that settlement decisions are influenced by docket delay). 
 45. See Robert G. Bone, Twombly, Pleading Rules, and the Regulation of Court Access, 
94 IOWA L. REV. 873, 922–23 (2009) (arguing that cause of meritless filings leading to 
unjustified settlements is not discovery costs, but asymmetric information); Silver, supra 
note 42, at 2093 (reviewing empirical data that undermine given wisdom that discovery costs 
force defendants to settle meritless suits). 
 46. See Emery G. Lee III & Thomas E. Willging, Defining the Problem of Cost in 
Federal Civil Litigation, 60 DUKE L.J. 765, 769–76 (2010) (reporting data that show that 
discovery costs are not high and that the most important variable contributing to discovery 
costs is the amount at stake in the litigation); Silver, supra note 42, at 2096–97. 
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Whatever the strength of these arguments in specific cases, there are no 
compelling data to suggest that there is a widespread problem of plaintiffs 
prevailing in meritless cases more often than defendants prevailing when they 
should not. And as for the role of settlement, precisely because the facts that 
undergird such cases are undeveloped and unadjudicated, claims about the extent to 
which defendants routinely settle frivolous or meritless cases are claims that at this 
point lack substantiation. Thus, I will limit my discussion of frivolous and meritless 
cases to those instances in which claimants are unsuccessful in obtaining anything 
of value through litigation, whether by trial or settlement. 
The next related question is whether all unsuccessful cases are also meritless 
(and, in some cases, frivolous). To answer it, one must break down the category of 
unsuccessful cases even further. In some cases, a plaintiff will be victorious at trial 
but have the outcome overturned on appeal. These cases, while ultimately 
unsuccessful, should not be considered meritless. Indeed, it is difficult to 
characterize any case that proceeds to trial, at least after a summary judgment 
adjudication, as meritless.47 If a reasonable jury could find in favor of the plaintiff, 
the case is not rendered meritless by the fact that the specific jury called to 
adjudicate a plaintiff’s case found for the defendant. After all, in most civil cases in 
which the burden of proof is a preponderance of the evidence, a plaintiff who loses 
at trial may have failed to convince the fact-finder by a very slim margin.48 If, 
however, a reasonable jury could not find in favor of the plaintiff, either for legal or 
factual reasons, her case should be considered meritless. Similarly, if a complaint 
does not state a claim for relief, for either legal or factual reasons, it should be 
considered meritless. And, clearly, if a complaint fails to meet pre-answer 
screening thresholds imposed by some specific statutes,49 it also should be 
considered meritless. 
There are some claims that do not easily fit into this universe. For instance, 
claims that are dismissed as a sanction for litigation-related conduct or as a 
consequence of the failure to prosecute are unsuccessful but have not had a merits 
adjudication.50 And claims that are ultimately unsuccessful because of an 
intervening change in law may not fairly be called meritless, at least at their 
inception.51 But these exceptions do not undermine the basic point that meritless 
and unsuccessful litigation are distinct. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 47. An exception might be if an appellate court determines that the case never should 
have been sent to the jury. 
 48. Empirical data regarding jury deliberations is difficult to come by, but some studies 
suggest that where jurors disagree about liability, they may mediate their disagreement by 
coming to a compromise on damages awards. See Meiring de Villiers, A Legal and Policy 
Analysis of Bifurcated Litigation, 2000 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 153, 177–82. This does not mean 
that the juries compromise in meritless cases, but only that a verdict may not reflect unanimity. 
 49. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915–1915A (2006). 
 50. For the purpose of preclusion doctrine, such claims will be considered to have been 
resolved “on the merits.” But preclusion doctrine is not the subject of this Article. 
 51. For instance, a prisoner in the Second Circuit who failed to exhaust his administrative 
remedies prior to filing a complaint regarding the use of excessive force would have had a 
viable claim at the inception of the lawsuit, but not after 2002 when the Supreme Court rejected 
the Second Circuit’s exception for exhaustion of excessive force claims. Hernadez v. Coffey, 
No. 99 Civ. 11615(WHP), 2003 WL 22241431, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2003) (applying the 
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If we were to sketch out the landscape I have described so far, it would look like 
this: all successful cases are meritorious, most unsuccessful cases are meritless,52 
but some meritorious cases are unsuccessful. It remains to be determined where to 
place frivolous litigation. As I have suggested earlier, in an ideal procedural system 
frivolous claims are not successful. Nor should frivolous claims proceed to trial. 
And they typically should be resolved before summary judgment and discovery. 
The hardest line to draw, however, may be between frivolous claims and those that 
do not meet a pre-discovery threshold.53 In both federal and state systems, this 
typically involves some assessment of the complaint and whether it states a claim 
for relief.54 Many, if not all, frivolous complaints will not state a claim for relief, 
but a complaint that fails to state a claim is not by definition frivolous. 
What, then, distinguishes a frivolous claim from a meritless one? As noted in the 
introduction, Robert Bone defines a frivolous action as one in which “a plaintiff 
files suit knowing facts that decisively establish little or no chance of the 
defendant’s objective liability on the basis of any of the legal theories plaintiff 
alleges” or “without conducting a reasonable prefiling investigation when such an 
investigation would have revealed facts establishing little or no chance that the 
defendant was actually liable on any of the legal theories alleged.”55 Bone’s 
definition, however, is focused on identifying frivolous litigation so as to regulate it 
and therefore hopefully deter its filing.56 Thus, Bone understandably gives great 
weight to the litigant or attorney’s state of mind. For the purposes of this Article, 
however, it is more useful to look to a definition that focuses on a court’s ability to 
distinguish frivolous cases for the purposes of case disposition. 
For the Supreme Court, a frivolous claim is one that lacks an arguable basis in 
fact or law.57 That is, a frivolous claim is one that relies on factual allegations or 
legal theories so outlandish as to be inarguably insufficient. By incorporating 
concerns of timing, I propose a conception that incorporates some of Bone’s and 
some of the Court’s: for the purpose of case disposition, a frivolous suit is one in 
which a judge determines that the plaintiff has no arguable basis to believe that she 
may establish the defendant’s liability on the basis of any of the legal theories she 
alleges. This modification is significant on several different levels. First, it focuses 
on what a judge may determine at any procedural stage. Most frivolous litigation is 
disposed of upon the filing of a complaint, when a judge may promptly determine 
                                                                                                                 
rule of Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516 (2002), to lawsuit filed in 1999). 
 52. This contention is based on the fact that most cases are resolved prior to trial. See 
Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in 
Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459, 459 (2004) (“The portion of 
federal civil cases resolved by trial fell from 11.5 percent in 1962 to 1.8 percent in 2002.”); 
see also Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Litigation Realities, 88 CORNELL L. 
REV. 119, 142–43 (2002) (citing statistics of the Administrative Office of the United States 
Courts showing decline in number of jury trials). Thus, most unsuccessful cases will not be 
resolved at trial; they will be resolved at the motion to dismiss or summary judgment stage. 
These cases will fall into the conception of meritless proposed here. 
 53. See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 326 (1989) (recognizing “overlap” between 
frivolous standard and failure-to-state-claim standard). 
 54. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3211(a)(7) (McKinney 2006). 
 55. Bone, supra note 22, at 531–32 (emphasis omitted). 
 56. See id. at 586–96. 
 57. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 325. 
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the basis for the plaintiff’s claims. But some litigation may not be revealed as 
frivolous until later in the litigation, after discovery shows that the plaintiff has no 
reasonable basis to continue to pursue her claims.58 Thus, in some ways, my 
conception is narrower than Bone’s (by focusing on what a judge may determine, 
not on what the plaintiff knows). And in some ways it is broader, by admitting the 
possibility that a case may become frivolous post-filing as a result of information 
disclosed by the parties. The “arguable basis” for the plaintiff’s belief is meant to 
be a combination of Bone’s focus on either the plaintiff’s knowledge or the 
plaintiff’s pre-filing investigation. But the limitation of frivolous to only those 
cases in which a plaintiff cannot succeed (as opposed to having “little or no 
chance” of success) is meant also to narrow the scope of frivolous cases.59 
If that conception of frivolous litigation serves the purposes of this Article, it is 
fair to ask what I mean by meritless litigation. A meritless claim, by contrast to a 
frivolous one, is a claim in which a court determines, after adversarial briefing or 
discovery, that a plaintiff’s theory of relief is insufficient or that a reasonable jury 
could not find facts that would allow a plaintiff to recover. Again, this conception 
involves considerations of both timing and substance. At the outset of litigation, it 
will be difficult for a court to judge the merits of a case. It may require argument 
from the parties to clarify the state of the law, or discovery to clarify factual 
disputes. 
The conception of frivolous litigation I put on the table is not without its 
drawbacks. First, it is important to recognize that it does not account for a 
defendant’s perceptions or goals. I focus on judicial perceptions of merit because 
deterring and regulating frivolous cases are primarily questions of judicial 
administration. It is the judiciary that is peculiarly harmed by frivolous litigation, 
because such litigation imposes costs without any coordinate benefit. By contrast, 
meritless litigation imposes costs but has the potential to add benefit to the legal 
system overall (more on that below). Defendants, on the other hand, are harmed 
equally by both meritless and frivolous litigation. They do not receive any benefit 
from either one and have to pay equally to defend them. From a defendant’s 
perspective, any meritless litigation that moves forward, whether frivolous or not, 
imposes a cost and provides no value. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 58. Notably, there would certainly be an argument that sanctions should issue to a 
litigant or lawyer who continues to prosecute a claim where discovery has revealed that there 
is a zero chance of success. The only point I am making here is that the case may be 
frivolous as a matter of adjudication as well. 
 59. Cf. Paul Stancil, Balancing the Pleading Equation, 61 BAYLOR L. REV. 90, 121 
(2009) (defining the “paradigmatically” frivolous suit as one in which both the plaintiff and 
the defendant determine that there is zero risk that the defendant will be held liable). This 
conception to some extent assumes that there is a valid way to stochastically evaluate merit. 
Identifying cases with a zero percent chance of success may seem possible in the abstract, 
but reliably doing so may prove impossible in practice. In this sense, it might be more 
accurate to think of cases as having varying degrees of merit. On this account, merit 
becomes easier to objectively assess as one obtains more information, but ultimately one can 
only hope to account for a fact-bound assessment that cannot be reduced to probabilities. 
While this view is compelling in many respects, it is not the view that has been adopted by 
courts or legislators, as I will discuss below. Thus, it is not as useful to this Article’s project. 
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Second, I began this Part with a discussion of merit that mixes both ex ante and 
ex post considerations. That is, I have relied on an ex post event (success) to define 
merit in part, but have proposed a standard that must be applied ex ante. This is not 
a problem that is unique to my conception of frivolous; any standard that is used to 
distinguish frivolous, meritless, and meritorious cases prior to submitting the claim 
to a finder of fact will suffer from the same difficulty. And to the extent that using 
ex ante assessments to evaluate merit is problematic, it is worth noting that courts 
and legislators, in imposing the rules I describe below, appear to be operating from 
the same rationale. Their goal has been to tighten the standards ex ante so as to 
reduce, ex post, the number of unsuccessful suits. Thus, for the purpose of this 
Article’s intervention, the difficulty of using an ex ante standard to make an ex post 
prediction is not troubling. 
II. JUDICIAL AND LEGISLATIVE FAILURE TO DISTINGUISH 
BETWEEN FRIVOLOUS AND MERITLESS LITIGATION 
Having put a conception of frivolous and meritless litigation on the table that 
distinguishes between the two categories, I will now turn to the world of legislators 
and judges, in which all nonmeritorious litigation is often treated as similarly 
burdensome and valueless. Thus, even if one had quibbles with the position I 
staked out in the previous Part, I will show in this Part how recent legislative and 
judicial changes have been premised on the conflation of meritless and frivolous 
litigation. Be it in subject-specific areas, such as civil rights or securities litigation, 
or in transsubstantive rules of pleading and summary disposition, judges and 
legislators enact rules that assume that meritless and frivolous litigation are nearly 
identical species of the same nonmeritorious genus. 
A. Transsubstantive Conflation 
For the most part, the judiciary is the source of most transsubstantive conflation 
of the benefits and burdens of meritless and frivolous litigation. Perceptions about 
frivolousness have influenced both courts and lawmakers to reduce affirmative 
incentives to sue, a reaction that cuts across lines of frivolous, meritless, and 
meritorious claims.60 The Supreme Court, for instance, has limited recovery of 
attorneys’ fees in civil rights cases, in part because of the assumption that the 
prospect of fee awards was generating frivolous litigation.61 State courts have done 
the same.62 To some extent all of these restrictions can be seen as a function of 
                                                                                                                 
 
 60. See Margaret H. Lemos, Special Incentives to Sue, 95 MINN. L. REV. 782, 826–28 
(2011) (discussing judicial tools to respond to perception of frivolous litigation). 
 61. See Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Human Res., 
532 U.S. 598, 618 (2001) (Scalia, J., concurring) (comparing payment of attorneys’ fees to 
extortion); Annabelle Chan, Comment, The Buckhannon Stops Here: Buckhannon Board & 
Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Department of Health & Human Resources Should Not 
Apply to the New York Equal Access to Justice Act, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 1341, 1358 (2004). 
 62. See Deborah L. Rhode, Public Interest Law: The Movement at Midlife, 60 STAN. L. 
REV. 2027, 2038 (2008) (describing trends in state and federal courts toward limiting fees); 
Andrea Saltzman, Incorporating Statutes into the Common Law: The Judicial Response to 
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judicial management of heavy caseloads.63 But the judicial and public perception of 
the strength of particular kinds of cases also inevitably plays a role.64 In this 
Subpart, I begin with a discussion of the Supreme Court’s recent transition in 
pleading doctrine, and then move to judicial innovation in the area of qualified 
immunity, before closing with legislatively imposed barriers to litigation by 
plaintiffs in poverty. 
1. Pleading Doctrine’s Response to Frivolous and Meritless Cases 
In all civil cases, the rules that govern pleading guide courts in conducting an 
initial assessment of merit. Although pre-answer screening for frivolousness is 
mandated for claims brought by certain categories of plaintiffs—discussed in more 
detail in other parts of this paper—even those procedures are informed by rules of 
pleading. Thus, whether through pre-answer screening or resolution of motions to 
dismiss, a court typically has its first opportunity to evaluate merit by reviewing the 
pleadings.  
As any casual reader of federal cases can attest, pleading jurisprudence has been 
indelibly marked by two recent Supreme Court decisions—Ashcroft v. Iqbal65 and 
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly.66 Although the extent of change wrought by these 
two decisions is subject to some debate,67 the notoriety of the cases is not.68 
                                                                                                                 
Statutes Shifting Attorneys’ Fees, 30 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1103, 1142 (1986) (describing state 
court hostility in Illinois to fee-shifting); see also John Leubsdorf, Towards a History of the 
American Rule on Attorney Fee Recovery, 47 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 1, 1984, at 9, 23 
(describing judicial resistance to including legal expenses as a component of damages). 
 63. See Lawrence M. Friedman, Legal Rules and the Process of Social Change, 19 
STAN. L. REV. 786, 800 (1967) (noting that judges may react to caseload pressures with the 
“adoption of ‘hostile’ substantive rules” effectively discouraging “litigants from using the 
courts”). 
 64. See Lemos, supra note 60, at 837 (“The risk of judicial backlash, then, depends to a 
large degree on judges’ views about the claims that Congress is seeking to encourage.”); 
Laura Beth Nielsen & Aaron Beim, Media Misrepresentation: Title VII, Print Media, and 
Public Perceptions of Discrimination Litigation, 15 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 237, 243 (2004) 
(“In the aggregate, the media represents plaintiff victories in tort cases far more frequently 
than they actually occur and jury awards as far greater than they actually are.”). 
 65. 556 U.S. 662 (2009). 
 66. 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
 67. Compare, e.g., Bone, supra note 45, at 875 (“Many judges and academic 
commentators read the decision as overturning fifty years of generous notice pleading 
practice . . . .”), Alexander A. Reinert, Pleading as Information-Forcing, 75 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 1, 2012, at 1 (arguing that Iqbal and Twombly represent a shift in the 
goals of pleading doctrine), and Spencer, supra note 24, at 432 (arguing that Twombly 
“represents a break from the Court’s previous embrace of notice pleading”), with Adam N. 
Steinman, The Pleading Problem, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1293, 1298 (2010) (arguing that Iqbal 
and Twombly are not a sea change in pleading). 
 68. As of this writing, Twombly has been cited in over 65,000 published cases and over 
1100 law review articles; Iqbal has been cited in over 43,000 cases and over 750 law review 
articles. Both Iqbal and Twombly have been cited more than twice as often as several other 
important cases that have dominated the legal landscape for decades, including Conley v. 
Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957), the seminal pleading case for five decades before Twombly and 
Iqbal, Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), the defining case for choice of 
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Understanding the significance of Iqbal and Twombly to the subject of this Article 
requires some recourse to history. 
The notice pleading standard was one of the most significant innovations of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, adopted in 1938.69 As many commentators have 
observed, the Rules eradicated the technicalities of claim-specific pleading that had 
dominated legal practice for decades in favor of reliance on discovery and trial to 
determine merit.70 Rule 8, requiring only a “short and plain statement of the claim 
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,”71 was a key intervention.72 Fact 
pleading, which the Federal Rules were meant to displace, too often “led to 
wasteful disputes about distinctions that [the drafters] thought were arbitrary or 
metaphysical, too often cutting off adjudication on the merits.”73 As originally 
conceived, Rule 12(b)(6) motions would test the sufficiency of complaints not by 
reference to the facts alleged in the complaint, but by reference to whether there 
was a legal claim that could be supported by the facts alleged.74 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Conley v. Gibson75 was the seminal pleading 
case for the five decades prior to Iqbal and Twombly. In Conley, the Court saw 
pleading as a way of “facilitat[ing] a proper decision on the merits”76 by giving a 
defendant “fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds upon which it 
rests.”77 Thus, according to Conley, a complaint satisfied Rule 8 without “set[ting] 
out in detail the facts upon which [the claimant] bases his claim.”78 To the extent 
that a defendant sought additional facts, the Conley Court was satisfied that Rule 
                                                                                                                 
law in diversity jurisdiction cases, and Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. National Resources Defense 
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), easily the most important administrative law case in the 
past fifty years. 
 69. See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2) (requiring a “short and plain statement of the claim 
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief”). 
 70. See Fairman, supra note 27, at 990–91; see also Richard L. Marcus, The Revival of 
Fact Pleading Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 433, 438–40 
(1986); Emily Sherwin, The Jurisprudence of Pleading: Rights, Rules, and Conley v. 
Gibson, 52 HOW. L.J. 73, 76–77 (2008) (summarizing history of pleading standards and 
functions from medieval origins onward). For an overall history of the Federal Rules, see 
generally Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909 (1987).  
 71. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). 
 72. The goal of the Federal Rules was to create both simplicity and uniformity in 
pleading and to prevent premature dismissals. See Marcus, supra note 70, at 439 (“Rule 
8(a)(2) was drafted carefully to avoid use of the charged phrases ‘fact,’ ‘conclusion,’ and 
‘cause of action.’”). 
 73. See Mark Herrmann, James M. Beck & Stephen B. Burbank, Debate, Plausible 
Denial: Should Congress Overrule Twombly and Iqbal?, 158 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 
141, 148 (2009), http://www.pennlawreview.com/online/158-U-Pa-L-Rev-PENNumbra-141.pdf 
(Burbank, Rebuttal). 
 74. As such, Rule 12(b)(6) motions were meant to address the rare circumstance in 
which a plaintiff’s claim for relief could be supported by no valid legal theory. See, e.g., 
Stephen B. Burbank & Stephen N. Subrin, Litigation and Democracy: Restoring a Realistic 
Prospect of Trial, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 399, 407 (2011). 
 75. 355 U.S. 41 (1957). 
 76. Id. at 48. 
 77. Id. at 47. 
 78. Id. 
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12(e), among other devices, would suffice.79 As for the role of Rule 12(b)(6) 
motions, true to the original understanding of the drafters of the Federal Rules, the 
Conley Court referred to “the accepted rule that a complaint should not be 
dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the 
plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to 
relief.”80 
Rule 8’s notice pleading standard dominated the resolution of pre-discovery 
motions, at least rhetorically, for decades.81 Until Twombly and Iqbal, the Supreme 
Court maintained a relatively consistent commitment to Conley’s notice pleading 
rule, twice unanimously rejecting heightened pleading standards in civil rights and 
employment discrimination cases.82 The Court acknowledged that there might be 
“practical merits” to heightened fact pleading,83 but maintained that such changes 
may be obtained only “by the process of amending the Federal Rules,” not by 
judicial decree.84 
The role of pleading changed with the Court’s decisions in Twombly and Iqbal. 
In the former, the Court adopted a “plausibility” standard in an antitrust case, 
expressing its concern, specifically in the antitrust context, that liberal pleading 
rules combined with expansive discovery would pressure defendants to settle 
meritless cases.85 In the Court’s view, careful case management by district courts 
had not proven successful at reducing these risks.86 Although many lower courts 
took note of Twombly, substantial questions lingered. Some lower courts 
considered the possibility that Twombly was limited to cases in which the costs of 
discovery were likely to be high and settlement-forcing.87 For others, Twombly was 
                                                                                                                 
 
 79. Id. at 48 n.9. 
 80. Id. at 45–46. 
 81. Christopher Fairman has argued that notice pleading has rarely been the rule, at least 
in practice, pointing to examples from antitrust, RICO, environmental, civil rights, 
intellectual property, and defamation cases, among others, in which lower courts have 
constructed a variety of heightened pleading standards. See Fairman, supra note 27, at 998–
1011 (summarizing different categories of heightened pleading). 
 82. See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512–13 (2002) (employment 
discrimination); Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 
507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993) (civil rights); see also Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 595 
(1998) (“[O]ur cases demonstrate that questions regarding pleading, discovery, and summary 
judgment are most frequently and most effectively resolved either by the rulemaking process 
or the legislative process.”). 
 83. Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 515. 
 84. Id. (quoting Leatherman, 507 U.S. at 168). 
 85. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S 544, 559–60 (2007); see also Randal C. 
Picker, Twombly, Leegin, and the Reshaping of Antitrust, 2007 SUP. CT. REV. 161, 177 
(arguing Twombly was motivated by concern about discovery “run amok”); Spencer, supra 
note 24, at 432, 477 (2008) (describing Twombly as indicative of the Court’s concern in 
screening frivolous filings). 
 86. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 559. 
 87. E.g., Tackett v. M & G Polymers, USA, LLC, 561 F.3d 478, 488–89 (6th Cir. 2009) 
(suggesting that Twombly was limited to “expensive, complicated litigation” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
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interpreted to apply broadly to all civil actions.88 The Court’s decision in Iqbal 
resolved this short-lived dispute by making it clear that plausibility pleading 
applied in all civil cases, not just antitrust claims.89  
Iqbal also articulated a two-step process for evaluating the sufficiency of a 
complaint.90 First, courts must review each allegation in a complaint and exclude 
from consideration those allegations that are stated in a “conclusory” fashion.91 In 
announcing this new gloss on pleading, the Court also held that allegations of state 
of mind, despite the explicit language of Rule 9(b),92 must be alleged with some 
factual detail.93 After disregarding conclusory allegations, Iqbal’s second step 
assesses whether there is a plausible fit between the nonconclusory facts alleged 
and the relief claimed.94 Courts applying the plausibility analysis are now instructed 
to rely on their “judicial experience and common sense,”95 a surprising turn from 
the limited judicial role contemplated in Conley.96 
The effect of Iqbal and Twombly taken together is to increase the potential 
opportunity to dismiss complaints prior to discovery by application of a test that 
assesses the merits of a claim prior to any discovery.97 This in and of itself is 
                                                                                                                 
 
 88. See, e.g., Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d 163, 172 n.6 (2d Cir. 2009); Total Benefits 
Planning Agency, Inc. v. Anthem Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 552 F.3d 430, 434 n.2 (6th Cir. 
2008). 
 89. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. at 686–87 (interpreting FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b) to require more than “general” 
allegations for state of mind even where neither fraud nor mistake is alleged). 
 93. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Notably, the Court had previously distinguished between the 
standard for failure to state a claim and the standard for judging frivolousness precisely on the 
ground that in the latter, courts may dismiss “based on a judge’s disbelief of a complaint’s 
factual allegations.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989). The power to look behind 
factual allegations did not exist (at least until Iqbal) under Rule 12(b)(6). See id. 
 94. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. 
 95. Id. 
 96. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47–48 (1957). 
 97. There is ample empirical evidence demonstrating that defendants file motions to dismiss 
more often post-Iqbal as compared to pre-Twombly. See JOE S. CECIL, GEORGE W. CORT, 
MARGARET S. WILLIAMS & JARED J. BATAILLON, FED. JUD. CENTER, MOTION TO DISMISS FOR 
FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM AFTER IQBAL 8 (2011), available at http://www.fjc.gov/library/fjc
_catalog.nsf (reporting a 55% increase in the rate at which defendants filed motions to dismiss 
between January and June 2010 as compared to January and June 2006). There also is evidence 
that the dismissal rate has increased post-Iqbal. See, e.g., Raymond H. Brescia, The Iqbal Effect: 
The Impact of New Pleading Standards in Employment and Housing Discrimination Litigation, 
100 KY. L.J. 235 (2011–2012) (reporting that dismissal rates in housing and employment 
discrimination cases increased after Iqbal, but not after Twombly); Patricia W. Hatamyar, The 
Tao of Pleading: Do Twombly and Iqbal Matter Empirically?, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 553, 556 
(2010) (estimating that motions to dismiss with leave to amend were four times more likely to be 
granted after Iqbal as they were during the Conley era, after controlling for relevant variables); 
Alexander A. Reinert, Measuring Iqbal (August 3, 2013) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with 
author) (reporting data from eleven district courts showing a significant increase in dismissal 
rates). But see CECIL ET AL., supra, at 13–14 (reporting an increase in dismissal rates, but finding 
that increase was not statistically significant). 
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significant because there is no evidence to support the proposition that heightened 
pleading standards like those announced in Iqbal and Twombly will serve as an 
accurate filter for merit.98 Courts may not be adequately positioned to sort out the 
multidimensional balancing necessary to arrive at an optimal pleading standard.99 
In other words, one harm flowing from Iqbal and Twombly is that the new pleading 
standard will result in dismissal of meritorious cases without the benefit of a more 
accurate determination of the meritless case.100 But, as I will expand upon in detail 
below, the plausibility pleading standard also will dispose of some meritless cases 
in ways that make it harder for those cases to add value to the legal system. That is, 
premature dismissal of even meritless cases has harmful legal consequences 
beyond the fact that courts will err in predicting ultimate merit. 
Like those courts that had flirted with heightened pleading since Conley,101 the 
Supreme Court’s decisions in Iqbal and Twombly can be attributed in large part to 
the perception that meritless and frivolous cases were proceeding to discovery too 
easily under notice pleading.102 Thus, in Twombly the Supreme Court spoke of the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 98. See Miller, supra note 22, at 49 (“It seems obvious that in many contexts attempting to 
distinguish the frivolous from the potentially meritorious on the basis of a single pleading is a 
dangerously uncertain endeavor.”); Suzanna Sherry, The Four Pillars of Constitutional 
Doctrine, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 969, 994 & n.102 (2011) (acknowledging that Iqbal and 
Twombly may have been directed towards frivolous lawsuits but that there is, “at best, mixed 
empirical support” to suggest that heightened pleading “weeds out the frivolous suits while 
allowing the weak but potentially meritorious suits to proceed”); Steinman, supra note 67, at 
1312 (questioning presumption that “stricter pleading standards are, in fact, well-suited to 
identifying which claims are meritorious enough to justify the costs of the discovery process”). 
 99. See Miller, supra note 22; Howard M. Wasserman, Iqbal, Procedural Mismatches, 
and Civil Rights Litigation, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 157, 164 (2010). 
 100. Robert Bone recognized this tradeoff well before Iqbal and Twombly, although in so 
doing he tended to conflate the meritless and frivolous case category. See Robert G. Bone, 
The Process of Making Process: Court Rulemaking, Democratic Legitimacy, and Procedural 
Efficacy, 87 GEO. L.J. 887, 911 (1999). For instance, in describing the tradeoff between 
notice pleading and “strict pleading,” Bone treated meritorious and frivolous as the two 
relevant categories of cases, implying that frivolous and meritless cases are one and the 
same. Notice pleading, he argued, will make it easier for both meritorious and frivolous 
claims to move forward, while a heightened pleading regime will make it harder on both 
categories. Id. Thus, “[t]o choose between notice pleading and strict pleading . . . [a 
rulemaker] must compare the seriousness of preventing a meritorious suit with the 
seriousness of allowing a frivolous suit.” Id. 
 101. See, e.g., Blaze, supra note 24, at 948–51 (describing development of heightened 
pleading in civil rights cases as a response to perception of frivolousness); Bone, supra note 
45, at 889–90 (discussing history of using heightened pleading standards in areas where 
problem of frivolous filing was thought to be high); Fairman, supra note 27, at 1059 
(discussing use of heightened pleading where perception of frivolousness was high); 
Christopher M. Fairman, Heightened Pleading, 81 TEX. L. REV. 551, 575–76 (2002) 
(describing history of heightened pleading in civil rights cases as means of reducing 
frivolous claims); Kit Kinports, Qualified Immunity in Section 1983 Cases: The Unanswered 
Questions, 23 GA. L. REV. 597, 657 (1989) (noting that some courts have imposed fact 
pleading to address perception that many constitutional torts are frivolous). 
 102. See Spencer, supra note 24, at 450–54 (discussing the “pleading policy” in Twombly 
of “screening of frivolous cases”); Benjamin P. Cooper, Iqbal’s Retro Revolution, 46 WAKE 
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“threat [that] discovery expense will push cost-conscious defendants to settle even 
anemic cases.”103 And in Iqbal the Court appealed to the imagery of a felonious 
plaintiff, “unlock[ing] the doors of discovery . . . armed with nothing more than 
conclusions.”104 Moreover, the Supreme Court was concerned that in the specific 
context of cases against federal officials, litigation and discovery were time and 
resource intensive, undermining “proper execution of the work of the 
Government.”105 Notably, the concerns expressed in Iqbal and Twombly mirror 
those voiced twenty years earlier, when the Supreme Court modified summary 
judgment as a result of concerns about meritless and frivolous litigation.106 
Iqbal and Twombly have sparked a vigorous debate about the proper role of 
pleading. Those who defend the new rules often point to the increased costs that 
meritless and frivolous cases place on the judicial system and defendants.107 Others 
support the new pleading standards because they increase efficiency by eliminating 
baseless claims as early as possible.108 Detractors have argued that the Court, 
                                                                                                                 
FOREST L. REV. 937, 961 (2011) (describing Iqbal and Rule 11 as addressed to problem of 
frivolous cases). 
 103. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 559 (2007). The Court also referred back to 
its decision in Dura Pharmaceuticals, which expressed the fear that a plaintiff with “a largely 
groundless claim” will be able to extract “an in terrorem increment of the settlement value.” Id. 
at 557–58 (quoting Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 347 (2005)). 
 104. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678–79 (2009) (emphasis added). 
 105. Id. at 685. 
 106. See generally Bone, supra note 22, at 521 (describing the Court’s emphasis on 
summary judgment and case management as proper tools to eliminate frivolous suits); Eric K. 
Yamamoto, Efficiency’s Threat to the Value of Accessible Courts for Minorities, 25 HARV. 
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 341, 375 (1990) (discussing how the summary judgment trilogy was aimed 
at eliminating meritless litigating earlier in process in the name of efficiency); see also 
Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Securities Class Actions as Pragmatic Ex Post Regulation, 43 GA. 
L. REV. 63, 78–79 (2008) (mentioning Rules 11, 12, and 56 as solutions for frivolous cases); 
Randy J. Kozel & David Rosenberg, Solving the Nuisance-Value Settlement Problem: 
Mandatory Summary Judgment, 90 VA. L. REV. 1849 (2004) (discussing the problem of 
frivolous cases and advocating mandatory summary judgment such that settlements can occur 
only after summary judgment review); Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Reputation Nation: Law in an 
Era of Ubiquitous Personal Information, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1667, 1684 (2008) (noting that 
summary judgment, among other methods, is used by courts to dispose of supposed frivolous 
civil rights claims). 
 107. See, e.g., Douglas G. Smith, The Twombly Revolution?, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 1063, 1067 
(2009); Tony Mauro, Plaintiffs Groups Mount Effort to Undo Supreme Court’s ‘Iqbal’ Ruling, 
NAT’L L.J. (N.Y.C.), Sept. 21, 2009, available at http://www.law.com/jsp
/article.jsp?id=1202433931370 (“Business advocates say that Iqbal weeds out weak or 
frivolous lawsuits and is a much-needed standard that will reduce federal court caseloads.”); 
Lisa A. Rickard, Repealing Iqbal and Twombly: Understanding the Physics of Politics, 
TOWNHALL.COM (July 15, 2010), http://townhall.com/columnists/lisaarickard/2010/07/15
/repealing_iqbal_and_twombly_understanding_the_physics_of_politics/page/full (“Reversing 
Iqbal and Twombly would increase the already-excessive litigation burdens on businesses in 
this country—small and large alike—diverting resources that would otherwise be used to create 
jobs and strengthen our nation’s economy.”). 
 108. See Andrew Blair-Stanek, Twombly Is the Logical Extension of the Mathews v. 
Eldridge Test to Discovery, 62 FLA. L. REV. 1, 22–23 (2010) (maintaining that plaintiff's 
interest in cases like Twombly is minimal because it is unlikely plaintiff has a valid claim); 
Scott Dodson, Comparative Convergences in Pleading Standards, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 441, 465 
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perhaps inadvertently, has imported standards from Rule 11 into the Rule 12(b)(6) 
context.109 And given the Court’s skepticism in Iqbal towards the effectiveness of 
Rule 11 as a deterrent to frivolous filings, perhaps it should be no surprise that it 
has recruited Rules 8 and 12 to solidify the barricades against baseless claims.110 
Some critics of Iqbal and Twombly acknowledge the potential efficiency benefits to 
heightened pleading but are doubtful that the decisions strike the right balance.111 
Even in their critiques, however, these commentators elide the distinction between 
meritless and frivolous claims.112 
                                                                                                                 
(2010) (citing efficiency goals as one justification for fact pleading); Geoffrey P. Miller, 
Preliminary Judgments, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 165, 167 (listing heightened pleading as one 
approach for filtering “weak or frivolous cases”); Smith, supra note 107, at 1067; Stancil, supra 
note 59, at 169 (suggesting that for certain kinds of cases heightened pleading can “reduce the 
cost disparities that can sometimes induce plaintiffs to file frivolous claims”). 
 109. See Bradley Scott Shannon, I Have Federal Pleading All Figured Out, 61 CASE W. 
RES. L. REV. 453, 489 (2011) (“[O]ne almost gets the sense that the Court’s plausibility 
standard, perhaps inadvertently, is intended to serve as a sort of proxy for a plaintiff’s 
obligations under Rule 11.”). As Shannon notes, if the problem in Iqbal and Twombly was 
whether the plaintiffs’ allegations were sufficiently supported by facts, Rule 11(b)(3) should 
suffice. Id. at 489–90. 
 110. The following colloquy from oral argument in Iqbal is revealing: 
JUSTICE GINSBURG: How about Rule 11 to take care of Justice Breyer’s 
problem? The judge would say to the lawyer: Now, you signed this pleading, and 
when you made—you signed it, you made certain representations, and I’m going 
to read the Riot Act to you if it turns out that this is a frivolous petition. 
GENERAL GARRE: Sure. That’s one protection, Justice Ginsburg. . . .  
. . .  
. . .  
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Reading the Riot Act to the lawyer is protection 
against the Attorney General and the Director of the FBI after they’re hauled in 
for discovery or subjected to depositions and the judge finds out— 
GENERAL GARRE: We— 
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: I’m sorry, Mr. Garre. 
—the judge finds out that there wasn’t in fact a sufficient basis for it, and 
that—that will show them, if they get read the Riot Act by a judge? 
GENERAL GARRE: It's certainly not adequate protection, Mr. Chief Justice. 
JUSTICE GINSBURG: I was responding to Justice Breyer's Coca-Cola 
president. I think Rule 11 would work quite well to answer that. 
GENERAL GARRE: I would have thought that this Court's decision in Bell 
Atlantic put an end to those sorts of claims . . . . 
Transcript of Oral Argument at 20–21, Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (No. 
07-1015). 
 111. See A. Benjamin Spencer, Understanding Pleading Doctrine, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1, 18 
(2009) (stating that one principle that might justify heightened pleading is efficiency, which 
“acknowledges that litigating meritless claims beyond the pleading stage wastes valuable time 
and money and thus it is important to screen out such claims at the earliest possible stage of the 
litigation”). 
 112. For instance, A. Benjamin Spencer has argued that Twombly (and by extension Iqbal) 
erred in its calibration between efficiency and justice for several reasons, including that the 
instability created by the plausibility standard will “underdeter frivolous claims and 
overencourage motions to dismiss,” and that the plausibility standard will bar truly meritorious 
claims. Id. at 26–30. 
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What everyone seems to agree on is that Iqbal and Twombly were motivated by 
the specter of frivolous and meritless litigation.113 But true to many of the changes I 
will discuss in this Article, the Court’s holdings treat both categories of cases as 
equally harmful. The highest priority is eliminating such cases from the federal 
docket as soon as possible. As the Court sees it, judicial resources should be 
reserved instead for the deserving plaintiffs with meritorious claims.114 
2. Conflation in Qualified Immunity Doctrine 
Qualified immunity in constitutional tort suits, a judicially created doctrine, also 
tends to conflate the frivolous with the meritless suit. Qualified immunity is a 
common-law concept, initially applied in the Bivens context, that offers protection 
from personal liability to government defendants who have not had “fair warning” 
that their conduct violated the law.115 The doctrine originally required that the 
plaintiff establish that the defendant officer acted in bad faith before imposing 
damages liability.116 But in the 1980s, it shifted from this subjective standard to a 
defense based on objective reasonableness, precisely because the defense was 
perceived to have been ineffective in reducing both frivolous and meritless claims 
against government officials.117 In justifying this shift, the Supreme Court 
                                                                                                                 
 
 113. See Bone, supra note 24, at 851 (arguing that Iqbal extends Twombly because 
“Twombly uses plausibility to screen only for truly meritless suits, but Iqbal uses it to screen 
for weak lawsuits too”); Hoffman, supra note 10, at 1231–33 (describing “high discovery 
expenses” and “nonmeritorious litigation” as Twombly’s “animating policy purposes”); 
Kenneth S. Klein, Removing the Blindfold and Tipping the Scales: The Unintended Lesson of 
Ashcroft v. Iqbal Is that Frivolous Lawsuits May Be Important to Our Nation, 41 RUTGERS 
L.J. 593, 605 (2010) [hereinafter Klein, Removing the Blindfold] (arguing that the Court in 
Iqbal was attempting to regulate frivolous lawsuits); Kenneth S. Klein, Is Ashcroft v. Iqbal the 
Death (Finally) of the “Historical Test” For Interpreting the Seventh Amendment?, 88 NEB. 
L. REV. 467, 469 (2010) (“Iqbal is a none-too-subtle signal from the Court that it is interested 
in utilizing Rule 12(b)(6) motions as a gate-keeping device to regulate potentially frivolous 
litigation . . . .”); Lemos, supra note 60, at 829–30 (characterizing Iqbal and Twombly as 
responses to concerns about “meritless strike suits”); Victor E. Schwartz & Christopher E. 
Appel, Rational Pleading in the Modern World of Civil Litigation: The Lessons and Public 
Policy Benefits of Twombly and Iqbal, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1107, 1109 (2010) 
(describing Iqbal and Twombly as reflecting the purpose of protection “against frivolous and 
purely speculative lawsuits” because such claims burden the judicial system and defendants, 
and “delay[] justice for meritorious cases”). 
 114. See, e.g., Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 560 n.6 (2007) (discussing 
burden on judges of managing discovery flowing from insubstantial claims). 
 115. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982); see also Hope v. Pelzer, 536 
U.S. 730, 739–40 (2002) (“[T]he defendant [is] entitled to ‘fair warning’ that his conduct 
deprived his victim of a constitutional right . . . .”); Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202 (2001) 
(“If the law did not put the officer on notice that his conduct would be clearly unlawful, 
summary judgment based on qualified immunity is appropriate.”); Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 
603, 621 (1999) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (discussing a state 
judge who had fair warning when eliciting sexual favors from a potential litigant). 
 116. See Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 322 (1975). 
 117. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 816–19; see also Stephen W. Miller, Note, Rethinking Prisoner 
Litigation: Shifting from Qualified Immunity to a Good Faith Defense in § 1983 Prisoner 
Lawsuits, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 929, 930–31 (2009). 
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emphasized its concern with frivolous and meritless cases, noting that 
constitutional tort claims “frequently run against the innocent as well as the 
guilty,”118 that “ingenious plaintiff’s counsel” are able to create material issues of 
fact based on scant evidence,119 and that immunity is necessary to terminate 
“insubstantial” suits.120 The defense now protects “all but the plainly incompetent” 
officers from a damages suit for constitutional violations.121 
Qualified immunity thus plays two significant roles in mapping the terrain of 
frivolous and meritless cases. First, as noted above and as commentators have 
recognized, qualified immunity is premised largely on the assumption that many 
constitutional tort claims are frivolous or meritless.122 At the same time, qualified 
immunity transforms an otherwise meritorious claim of constitutional violation into 
a meritless one. Under Harlow and its progeny, defendants can establish the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 118. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 814; cf. Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 91 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., 
dissenting) (describing “torrent of frivolous” constitutional tort claims); Imbler v. Pachtman, 
424 U.S. 409, 425 (1976) (reasoning that in the absence of immunity, suits against 
prosecutors “could be expected with some frequency, for a defendant often will transform 
his resentment at being prosecuted into the ascription of improper and malicious actions to 
the State’s advocate”). 
 119. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 817 n.29 (quoting Halperin v. Kissinger, 606 F.2d 1192, 1214 
(D.C. Cir. 1979) (Gesell, J., concurring), aff’d by an equally divided court, 452 U.S. 713 (1981)). 
 120. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 507–08 (1978); see also Pearson v. Callahan, 555 
U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (using same language); Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 165–166 (1992) 
(same); Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 n.2 (1987) (same); Harrison v. Ash, 539 
F.3d 510, 523 (6th Cir. 2008) (qualified immunity protects against frivolous litigation); 
Gregoire v. Class, 236 F.3d 413, 417 (8th Cir. 2000) (same); Hemphill v. Schott, 141 F.3d 412, 
420 (2d Cir. 1998) (same); Austin Mun. Sec., Inc. v. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 757 F.2d 
676, 686 (5th Cir. 1985) (same); Maiorana v. MacDonald, 596 F.2d 1072, 1077 (1st Cir. 1979) 
(“There are two competing considerations bearing on whether summary judgment should be 
granted in civil rights cases where qualified immunity is asserted. The traditional reluctance to 
grant summary judgment in cases involving state of mind issues (such as good faith) is 
counterbalanced by the desirability of screening out frivolous actions through the summary 
judgment filter so as not to discourage officials from taking necessary and decisive action.”). 
The need to protect defendants from the burdens of meritless and frivolous suits has 
additionally been used to justify interlocutory appeals of qualified immunity decisions at every 
procedural stage, thus guaranteeing that a plaintiff must be patient to dream of achieving a 
favorable judgment. See Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299 (1996). 
 121. Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986). 
 122. See Alan K. Chen, The Burdens of Qualified Immunity: Summary Judgment and the 
Role of Facts in Constitutional Tort Law, 47 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 14 (1997); Diana Hassel, Living 
a Lie: The Cost of Qualified Immunity, 64 MO. L. REV. 123, 131 (1999); Courtney W. 
Howland, The Hands-Off Policy and Intramilitary Torts, 71 IOWA L. REV. 93, 151–52 (1985); 
Margaret Z. Johns, Reconsidering Absolute Prosecutorial Immunity, 2005 BYU L. REV. 53, 
143; Kit Kinports, Qualified Immunity in Section 1983 Cases: The Unanswered Questions, 23 
GA. L. REV. 597, 611 (1989); Sheldon Nahmod, Constitutional Torts, Over-Deterrence and 
Supervisory Liability After Iqbal, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 279, 287 (2010); H. Allen Black, 
Note, Balance, Band-Aid, or Tourniquet: The Illusion of Qualified Immunity for Federal 
Officials, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 733, 748–49 (1991); Chad Howell, Note, Qualified 
Discovery: How Ashcroft v. Iqbal Endangers Discovery When Civil Rights Plaintiffs File Suit 
Against Government Officials, 21 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 299, 302 (2011). 
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affirmative defense of qualified immunity through one of two routes: (1) by 
showing that the defendant’s conduct did not violate law that was clearly 
established at the time she acted; or (2) by showing that the defendant reasonably 
believed that her conduct did not violate clearly established law.123 If a defendant 
can prevail on either prong, then she is entitled to qualified immunity.124 In other 
words, a plaintiff may be able to show that the defendant violated the Constitution, 
but if the law was not clearly established at the time of the violation, the plaintiff’s 
complaint will be dismissed.125 
The relationship between clearly established law and the underlying 
constitutional violation is the aspect of qualified immunity that relates most directly 
to the argument pursued in this Article. If a court finds that particular law is not 
clearly established, it need never decide whether a particular set of allegations 
states a claim for a violation of the Constitution. This tension was less of a concern 
when the Supreme Court adhered to a “rigid order of battle” that required lower 
courts to first decide whether the plaintiff had established a violation of the 
Constitution before addressing whether the law was clearly established at the time 
of the violation.126 But in 2009 the Court changed course, holding that lower courts 
are free to decide first the state of clearly established law.127 The Court recognized 
that this shift had the potential to stunt the development of constitutional law but 
justified the shift in part on the original grounds for the qualified immunity defense: 
the need to protect defendants from the burdens of meritless litigation.128 
3. Conflation in In Forma Pauperis Litigation 
One final example of transsubstantive conflation of frivolous and meritless 
litigation can be found in legislative changes to screening of complaints filed in 
forma pauperis. Prior to 1996, cases filed in federal court by individuals who could 
                                                                                                                 
 
 123. See Malley, 475 U.S. at 341. 
 124. At least superficially, qualified immunity is an affirmative defense. See, e.g., Gomez 
v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980). The defendant always has some minimal burden to 
establish an entitlement to the defense, but some circuits, as discussed in greater detail 
below, have adopted variations of a burden-shifting scheme that places much of the burden 
of rebutting the defense on the plaintiff. 
 125. For some commentators, this is sufficient to treat cases dismissed on qualified 
immunity grounds as frivolous. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Asking the Right Questions About 
Officer Immunity, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 479, 503–05 (2011). In my view, it is more accurate 
to say that qualified immunity redistributes the burdens of constitutional violations by 
making otherwise meritorious constitutional claims unsuccessful. 
 126. Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 201–02 (2004) (Breyer, J., concurring) (internal 
quotation marks omitted) (describing qualified immunity analysis adopted in Saucier v. 
Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200–01 (2001)). 
 127. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009). 
 128. Id. at 237 (noting that the Saucier rule “disserves the purpose of qualified immunity 
when it forces the parties to endure additional burdens of suit . . . when the suit otherwise 
could be disposed of more readily” (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted)). This 
was not the only reason for the Court’s shift from Saucier to Pearson: the Court also was 
concerned with the problem of advisory opinions and, more broadly, deciding difficult 
constitutional questions prematurely. Id. at 237–38. 
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not afford the filing fee were screened (pre-filing and pre-answer) for 
frivolousness.129 When the Supreme Court interpreted this provision in 1992, it 
specifically held that frivolous claims were distinct from claims that failed to state a 
claim for relief within the meaning of Rule 12(b)(6).130 In Neitzke, the Court held 
that although there was “considerable” overlap between the failure-to-state-a-claim 
standard and the frivolousness standard, “it does not follow that a complaint which 
falls afoul of the former standard will invariably fall afoul of the latter.”131 
There were three reasons that the Court cautioned against the “conflat[ion of] 
the standards of frivolousness and failure to state a claim.”132 First, the Court 
distinguished between the ability of courts to dismiss for frivolousness “based on a 
judge’s disbelief of a complaint’s factual allegations,” power that did not exist (at 
least until Iqbal) under Rule 12(b)(6).133 Second, the Court recognized that 
substantial legal questions could exist in cases resolved under Rule 12(b)(6) 
motions: “To term these claims frivolous is to distort measurably the meaning of 
frivolousness both in common and legal parlance.”134 Finally, Nietzke emphasized 
that the procedural protections provided at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage—notice, an 
opportunity to oppose the motion, and an opportunity to amend or clarify a 
complaint—ensure a complete record and careful and thorough decision making.135 
In 1996, Congress amended the in forma pauperis statute.136 Whereas the statute 
previously had required courts to screen solely for frivolous or malicious filings, 
now such cases are screened for being frivolous, for failing to state a claim, and for 
seeking damages from a defendant who is immune from liability.137 In other words, 
Congress legislated to conflate meritless and frivolous litigation in the same way 
rejected by the Court in Nietzke. 
B. Context-Specific Conflation 
Contrary to the transsubstantive rules reviewed above, many of the rules 
adopted by legislators and judges are subject-matter specific. The area that has 
received perhaps the most attention in federal courts has been prisoners’ rights 
litigation, and I will begin there before moving to examples from securities 
litigation and antitrust. This review demonstrates that both Congress and the courts 
have constructed procedural and substantive rules that treat meritless and frivolous 
litigation as equally troublesome. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 129. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) (1996) (providing that cases could be dismissed 
sua sponte for being frivolous or malicious). 
 130. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325–27 (1992). 
 131. Id. at 326. 
 132. Id. at 330. 
 133. Id. at 327. 
 134. Id. at 328–29. 
 135. Id. at 329–30. 
 136. See Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-134, § 804(a)(5), 110 
Stat. 1321, 1321-74 (2006). 
 137. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) (2006). 
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1. Prisoners’ Rights Litigation 
It is not hard to find examples of conflation of the meritless with the frivolous in 
the area of prisoners’ rights. At the federal level, the Prison Litigation Reform Act 
(PLRA) accomplishes this in at least three ways.138 First, the PLRA has pre-answer 
screening procedures that treat both categories of cases the same.139 Second, the 
PLRA contains a repeat filer provision that penalizes prisoners for filing previously 
dismissed litigation, whether frivolous or simply meritless.140 And finally, the 
PLRA imposes an exhaustion requirement that was prompted by concerns about 
frivolous litigation but functions to filter out cases of all types.141 Importantly, each 
of these provisions, like the PLRA itself, was intended to reduce frivolous filings 
by prisoners.142 
Like the in forma pauperis statute already discussed, the PLRA’s screening 
procedure mandates that courts examine all prisoner filings before docketing or as 
soon as possible to determine whether they are frivolous, fail to state a claim for 
relief, or seek damages from a defendant who is immune from damages suits.143 
One can appreciate the need to screen complaints for frivolousness as soon as 
possible—after all, frivolousness should, in some cases, be capable of being 
determined on the face of a complaint. But screening for meritlessness—either 
because a complaint fails to state a claim or because it seeks a remedy against a 
defendant who is immune from suit—suggests that from the legislation’s 
perspective such claims are as harmful as frivolous claims and offer no benefit.144 
The advantages of having a judge resolve the merit of a case by motion are 
manifold. First of all, a judge might, by screening for failure to state a claim or for 
substantive immunity, end up adjudicating an affirmative defense before a 
defendant has even shouldered the burden of establishing it.145 Qualified immunity 
                                                                                                                 
 
 138. See Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 §§ 801–810, 110 Stat. at 1321-66 to -77 
(1996) (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. § 523 (2012); 18 U.S.C. §§ 3624, 3626 (2012); 28 
U.S.C. §§ 1346, 1915, 1915A (2006); 42 U.S.C. §§ 1997–1997h (2006)). As I will discuss 
below, many states also have adopted analogs to the Federal PLRA. See infra notes 162–65 
and accompanying text. 
 139. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A(b). 
 140. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). 
 141. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). 
 142. See Skinner v. Switzer, 131 S. Ct. 1289, 1299 (2011) (describing three-strikes 
provision and exhaustion provision as intended to “prevent sportive filings in federal court”); 
Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 97 (2006) (“[T]he PLRA . . . was intended to deal with what 
was perceived as a disruptive tide of frivolous prisoner litigation . . . . ”); Porter v. Nussle, 
534 U.S. 516, 524–25 (2002) (noting that Congress enacted the PLRA “to reduce the 
quantity and improve the quality of prisoner suits”); Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 737 
(2001) (explaining that exhaustion provision designed to filter frivolous claims). 
 143. This provision applies regardless of whether the prisoner has paid the full filing fee 
or is proceeding in forma pauperis. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A(b). 
 144. Indeed, it is unclear that courts are even distinguishing frivolousness from failure to 
state a claim in their screening function. See, e.g., Thorpe v. Little, 804 F. Supp. 2d 174, 185 
(D. Del. 2011). 
 145. See, e.g., LeBlanc v. Snavely, 453 F. App’x 140 (3d Cir. 2011) (affirming § 1915A 
dismissal based on statute of limitations); Terry v. Bailey, 376 F. App’x 894, 895 n.2 (11th 
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is an affirmative defense that typically must be asserted and shown by the 
defendant.146 The same goes for some defenses that are adjudicated as Rule 
12(b)(6) motions, such as statute of limitations or res judicata.147 Importantly, the 
establishment of either of these defenses does not necessarily detract from the 
underlying merit of a plaintiff’s complaint. And if a defendant consciously or 
erroneously forfeits any of these defenses, a plaintiff’s suit may go forward for a 
determination of the merits. Accordingly, the PLRA encourages courts to 
prematurely resolve cases involving prisoners’ rights because of the overriding goal 
of eliminating frivolous litigation. 
Moreover, pre-screening complaints for failure to state a claim for relief may 
lead to worse decision making. After Iqbal and Twombly, resolving failure to state 
a claim issues is notoriously complex.148 Doing so in the absence of any briefing by 
the parties creates an unnecessary risk of error. Even before those cases, the 
Supreme Court adverted to the importance of adjudicating failure-to-state-a-claim 
dismissals in the context of adversarial briefing because of the opportunity it 
provides a litigant to amend or otherwise clarify his complaint.149 Finally, 
pre-screening tends to occur under the radar of reported decisions or even fully 
reasoned written opinions.150 Thus, to the extent that the adjudication of meritless 
cases can provide guidance to future actors within the legal system, pre-screening 
deprives the legal universe of that benefit. 
Perhaps even more indicative of legislative conflation of frivolous and meritless 
cases in the PLRA is the statute’s three-strikes provision, which bars a plaintiff 
from filing a lawsuit in forma pauperis if he has previously had three complaints 
dismissed for being frivolous, failing to state a claim, or for seeking damages from 
an immune defendant.151 Thus, whatever the merits of a particular plaintiff’s 
lawsuit, a dismissal on statute of limitations grounds, exhaustion grounds, or 
immunity will be treated as equivalent to a claim that was frivolous. The 
implication of the three-strikes provision is clear: from Congress’s perspective, a 
meritless claim is just as harmful as a frivolous one and to be equally sanctioned. 
                                                                                                                 
Cir. 2010) (affirming on alternative grounds lower court decision that entered § 1915A 
dismissal based on qualified immunity); Okpala v. Drew, 248 F. App’x 72 (11th Cir. 2007) 
(affirming § 1915A dismissal on exhaustion grounds because the affirmative defense 
appeared on the face of the complaint); Tijerina v. Patterson, 244 F. App’x 235 (10th Cir. 
2007) (affirming § 1915A dismissal based on qualified immunity); Butts v. Wilkinson, No. 
96-4280, 1998 WL 152778, at *1 (6th Cir. 1998) (affirming § 1915A dismissal on res 
judicata and statute of limitations grounds). 
 146. See Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 639–41 (1980); cf. Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 
U.S. 574, 586–87 (1998). 
 147. See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(c). 
 148. See supra notes 90–101 and accompanying text. 
 149. See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 329–30 (1989) (summarizing advantages of 
procedures provided in ordinary Rule 12(b)(6) motion practice). 
 150. See Henry F. Fradella, In Search of Meritorious Claims: A Study of the Processing 
of Prisoner Civil Rights Cases in a Federal District Court, 21 JUST. SYS. J. 23, 27 (1999) 
(“The overwhelming majority of prisoner civil rights cases are disposed by unpublished 
memorandum decisions . . . .”). 
 151. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) (2006). This provision contains an exception for prisoners 
under “imminent danger of serious physical injury.” 
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Finally, the PLRA imposes an exhaustion requirement in prison cases that 
distinguishes prisoner litigation from all other civil rights claims.152 Exhaustion of 
administrative remedies is typically not required in most civil rights litigation.153 
The principal articulated reason for imposing this mandatory requirement on 
prisoners was to reduce the quantity of “frivolous” prisoner suits.154 Even before 
the PLRA was enacted in 1996, federal courts viewed exhaustion as a means to 
separate out the meritorious cases from the “frivolous” ones.155 As many judges 
and legislators saw it, adjudicating prisoner suits was like looking for the one 
meritorious needle in the haystack of frivolous litigation.156 
The PLRA’s exhaustion requirement, however, does not distinguish between 
frivolous and nonfrivolous cases. No exception exists for cases that a judge 
believes are likely to have merit, and even where a prisoner seeks remedies that 
cannot be provided by a prison’s internal grievance procedure, the exhaustion 
requirement is strictly imposed.157 The result is a scattershot approach to reducing 
prison litigation, likely to equally limit frivolous, meritless, and meritorious 
litigation. The Supreme Court has assumed, however, that exhaustion and other 
PLRA provisions will draw a useful line between frivolous/meritless claims on one 
hand and meritorious claims on the other.158 
Exhaustion requirements are not unique to prison cases. They have been 
legislatively imposed in employment discrimination cases, challenges to agency 
determinations, and for tort claims against federal, state, and local government 
entities, among others.159 Exhaustion has been judicially imposed in ERISA cases 
and some agency proceedings.160 In general, however, the justification for 
                                                                                                                 
 
 152. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (2006); see also Schlanger, supra note 41, at 1635 n.272 
(listing states that had enacted statutes similar to the PLRA as of 2003). As of 2003, only 
Alabama, Connecticut, the District of Columbia, Nebraska, North Dakota, Rhode Island, 
Vermont, and Wyoming had failed to pass a state analog to the PLRA. Since then, none of 
these states has imposed a state-based exhaustion requirement for prisoners. 
 153. See Patsy v. Bd. of Regents, 457 U.S. 496 (1982). 
 154. Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 97 (2006) (“[T]he PLRA . . . was intended to deal 
with what was perceived as a disruptive tide of frivolous prisoner litigation . . . . ”); Porter v. 
Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 524–25 (2002) (noting that Congress enacted the PLRA “to reduce the 
quantity and improve the quality of prisoner suits”); Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 737 
(2001) (explaining that exhaustion provision designed to filter frivolous claims). 
 155. Patsy, 457 U.S. at 535 (Powell, J., dissenting) (discussing motivation for 
predecessor to PLRA). 
 156. See Jon O. Newman, Pro Se Prisoner Litigation: Looking for Needles in Haystacks, 
62 BROOK. L. REV. 519, 520–22 (1996). 
 157. Ngo, 548 U.S. at 97; Booth, 532 U.S. at 737. 
 158. See Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 203 (2007) (observing that most prison litigation 
cases, which as of 2005 accounted for almost ten percent of all civil cases filed in federal 
court, “have no merit” and “many are frivolous,” and that “[t]he challenge lies in ensuring 
that the flood of nonmeritorious claims does not submerge and effectively preclude 
consideration of the allegations with merit”). 
 159. See United States v. L.A. Tucker Truck Lines, Inc., 344 U.S. 33, 36 n.6 (1952) 
(collecting statutes); Wash. Ass’n for Television & Children v. FCC, 712 F.2d 677, 681–82 
& n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (collecting statutes). 
 160. See, e.g., L.A. Tucker Truck Lines, 344 U.S. at 33 (Interstate Commerce 
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exhaustion in these contexts has not revolved around the reduction of frivolous 
litigation, and the exhaustion requirements are much less draconian than the 
parallel PLRA requirements.161 As such, exhaustion in these contexts poses less of 
a risk of blindly condemning frivolous and nonfrivolous litigation. 
These restrictions on prisoner litigation are not limited to the federal courts. 
Many of the provisions found in the PLRA have been adopted in states that seek to 
limit prisoners’ rights litigation. Thus, many states have pre-screening provisions 
that are identical to the PLRA.162 And three-strikes provisions are common at the 
state level as well.163 Indeed, in South Carolina, a prisoner who violates the three-
strikes provision may be sentenced to a year’s imprisonment, in addition to the 
prisoner’s current sentence.164 Finally, many states also have exhaustion 
requirements that are similar to the PLRA’s.165 
                                                                                                                 
Commission); Unemployment Comp. Comm’n v. Aragon, 329 U.S. 143 (1946) 
(unemployment compensation commission); Hormel v. Helvering, 312 U.S. 552, 557–59 
(1941) (Board of Tax Appeals); Paese v. Hartford Life & Acc. Ins., 449 F.3d 435, 445 (2d 
Cir. 2006) (ERISA); see also Gregory C. Braden, Andrew G. Sakallaris & Michael R. 
Maryn, What’s New in Employee Benefits in 2008: A Summary of Current Case Law 
Developments, in PENSION, PROFIT-SHARING, WELFARE, AND OTHER COMPENSATION PLANS 1, 
108 (ALI-ABA Course of Study, 2009) (enumerating ERISA cases requiring plaintiffs to 
exhaust administrative remedies). 
 161. Judicially imposed exhaustion requirements are typically based on an analogy to 
appellate courts refraining from passing on issues not raised in the court below. See Sims v. 
Apfel, 530 U.S. 103, 109–10 (2000) (describing situations in which judicially imposed 
exhaustion requirements are appropriate); Air Line Pilots Ass’n v. Miller, 523 U.S. 866, 
878–79 (1998) (rejecting efficiency argument for exhaustion). As such, courts are more 
likely to impose exhaustion where there is no legislative intent to preclude exhaustion and 
where an administrative proceeding is adversarial. Sims, 530 U.S. at 109–10; Darby v. 
Cisneros, 509 U.S. 137, 144–46 (1993) (finding that APA precluded exhaustion). For 
instance, traditional exceptions to the exhaustion requirement in other contexts––futility, bias 
of the ultimate decision maker, hardship, and inadequate remedies––do not apply in PLRA 
cases. Compare Booth, 532 U.S. at 737 (rejecting futility exception to exhaustion), and Ngo, 
548 U.S. at 97 (requiring “proper” exhaustion under PLRA), with Sims, 530 U.S. at 115 
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (constitutional claims), Shalala v. Ill. Council on Long Term Care, 
Inc., 529 U.S. 1, 13 (2000) (futility), McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 147–48 (1992) 
(futility and biased decision maker), and McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 197–201 
(1969) (balancing interests in applying exhaustion rule against hardship imposed as a result). 
 162. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-106-302(b) (2006); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 57.085(6)(a), 
(6)(d) (West 2006); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 31-3220A(14) (2006); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-13-7-
1(c) (West 2011); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:1188(A) (2005); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. 
PROC. § 5-1004(b) (LexisNexis 2013); MO. ANN. STAT. § 506.381 (West 2003); WIS. STAT. 
ANN. § 802.05(4)(b) (West 2013). 
 163. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-68-607 (2006); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-17.5-
102.7(1) (West 2005); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 8804(f) (Supp. 2012); IOWA CODE ANN. § 
610A.1(1)(e) (West Supp. 2013); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:1187 (2005); MD. CODE ANN., 
CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5-1004(b) (LexisNexis 2013); MISS. CODE ANN. § 47-5-76(1) (West 
2012); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 57, § 566.2(A) (West 2004); OR. REV. STAT. § 30.645(1) 
(2011) (limited to IFP plaintiffs); S.C. CODE ANN. § 24-27-300 (2007); TENN. CODE ANN. § 
41-21-807(c) (2010); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-692 (2007) (limited to IFP plaintiffs); W. VA. 
CODE, § 25-1A-4(a) (LexisNexis 2013). 
 164. S.C. CODE ANN. § 24-27-300. 
 165. See ALASKA STAT. § 09.19.200(a) (2012) (requiring exhaustion for prospective 
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2. Securities Litigation 
Although prisoners’ rights litigation has been a source of much legislation that 
treats meritless and frivolous litigation as one and the same, there are other areas of 
substantive law that Congress has deemed appropriate for similar treatment. The 
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA), for example, was passed 
because of the perception that frivolous and meritless securities class action claims 
were pressuring defendants into unjust settlements.166 When it summarized the 
logic behind the PSLRA, Congress lumped abusive, frivolous, and meritless 
lawsuits together as equally damaging to the public, the courts, investors, and 
issuers of securities.167 Legislators thought that Rule 11 was not used sufficiently 
often to deter such lawsuits.168 Accordingly, the PSLRA set out to increase 
                                                                                                                 
relief); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-106-301; COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-17.5-102.3(1); DEL. 
CODE ANN. tit. 10 § 8804(g); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-4206(1); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
15:1184(A)(2); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5-1003(a)(1); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. 
§ 600.5503(1) (West 1996); MO. REV. STAT. §510.125(1) (2013); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 148-
118.2(b) (West 2009); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 57 § 564.1(A) (West Supp. 2013) (requiring 
exhaustion for challenges to rescission of good-time credits); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 57 § 
566.3(G) (West 2004 & Supp. 2013) (requiring exhaustion for all prisoner claims); S.D. 
CODIFIED LAWS § 21-62-2 (Supp. 2013); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 801.02(7)(b). 
 166. See Leslie M. Kelleher, Taking “Substantive Rights” (in the Rules Enabling Act) 
More Seriously, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 47, 51–53 (1998). 
 167. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 31–32 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730 
(justifying the PSLRA by reference to “abusive and meritless suits,” “abusive and 
manipulative securities litigation,” and “frivolous litigation,” none of which was thought to 
be sufficiently managed by Rule 11). There was, as to be expected, some disagreement about 
the extent of the problem of frivolous litigation in the area of securities law. Private 
Litigation Under the Federal Securities Laws: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Sec. of the 
S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs, 103d Cong. 280 (1993) (statement of Sen. 
Dodd) (“[A]fter a long hearing that lasted well into the afternoon, we found no agreement on 
whether there is in fact a problem, the extent of the problem, or the solution to the 
problem.”). Compare Janet Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements 
in Securities Class Actions, 43 STAN. L. REV. 497 (1991) (reporting a study of nine 
settlements in cases filed related to IPOs of computer and computer-related companies and 
concluding that the settlement value of litigation is related more to the nuisance value of 
litigation than to its merits), with Joel Seligman, Commentary, The Merits Do Matter: A 
Comment on Professor Grundfest’s “Disimplying Private Rights of Action Under the 
Federal Securities Laws: The Commission’s Authority,” 108 HARV. L. REV. 438, 445–48 
(1994) (arguing that federal courts did not need additional tools to address meritless 
securities litigation), and id. at 449–55 (criticizing studies that purport to show companies 
settling regardless of merit, including Alexander’s, on both methodological and analytical 
grounds). Subsequent empirical analyses have cast doubt on the proposition that settlement 
of securities actions is unrelated to merit. See Stephen J. Choi, Do the Merits Matter Less 
After the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act?, 23 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 598, 600 (2007) 
(concluding that despite Congress’s intent the PSLRA likely deterred the filing of a 
substantial number of meritorious cases); James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Does the 
Plaintiff Matter? An Empirical Analysis of Lead Plaintiffs in Securities Class Actions, 106 
COLUM. L. REV. 1587, 1631 n.153 (2006). 
 168. H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 39. 
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obstacles to securities litigation so as to reduce the quantity and improve the quality 
of filed cases.169 
Most significantly, the PSLRA heightened pleading standards for securities 
class actions based on fraud, on the theory that it was too easy to allege fraud in the 
context of securities class actions. Any claim involving fraud must provide certain 
specific allegations about the statements alleged to have been misleading and also 
“state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant 
acted with the required state of mind.”170 As commentators have recognized, many 
courts have interpreted this pleading standard to require evidence, not simply well-
pleaded allegations, and many courts have interpreted the PSLRA in ways that 
discount circumstantial evidence of fraud.171 Altering the usual procedural course, 
the statute also provides for a stay of all discovery—in fraud and nonfraud cases—
during the pendency of a motion to dismiss.172 In addition, to prevent abusive 
litigation, the PSLRA imposes certain filing obligations that ensure that lead 
plaintiffs are not “professional plaintiffs” because of the perception that lawyers 
recruit plaintiffs to purchase shares of stock and then serve as named 
representatives to earn a higher share of any recovery.173 Finally, the statute imports 
a loss causation element as part of any plaintiff’s burden of proof and also imposes 
a cap on damages.174 And the statute alters the usual rule on joint and several 
liability to limit the pressure on “innocent” defendants to settle “meritless” 
litigation.175 
Aside from these substantive provisions, the statute includes additional tools for 
courts to sanction attorneys and parties for violating Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 11. These include mandatory review of filings upon final adjudication of 
the action,176 mandatory sanctions for any such violations,177 and a presumptive 
                                                                                                                 
 
 169. See id. at 32–35 (describing goal of improving quality of representation in 
shareholder suits); id. at 39 (acknowledging “need to reduce significantly the filing of 
meritless securities lawsuits without hindering the ability of victims of fraud to pursue 
legitimate claims”). 
 170. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2)(a) (2012); see id. § 78u-4(b)(1) (describing pleading 
standard for misleading statements and omissions); id. § 78u-4(b)(2) (describing pleading 
standard for alleging required state of mind). 
 171. See Michael J. Kaufman & John M. Wunderlich, The Judicial Access Barriers to 
Remedies for Securities Fraud, 75 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 1, 2012, at 55, 57–59. 
 172. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(3)(B); id. § 77z-1(b)(1); H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 37 
(explaining that stay of discovery was intended to prevent the cost of discovery to pressure 
settlement of a “frivolous” case). 
 173. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(2)(A)(ii), (v), (vi) (providing that plaintiff provide a 
statement certifying that he did not purchase securities at direction of counsel, identifying the 
prior actions in which the plaintiff has sought to serve as a class representative, and promising 
not to accept any payment beyond his pro rata share); id. § 77z-1(a)(2)(A)(ii), (v), (vi) (same); 
see also H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 33 (“The Conference Committee believes these practices 
[(filing by professional plaintiffs)] have encouraged the filing of abusive cases.”). 
 174. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(4), (e)(1). 
 175. See id. § 78u-4(f); H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 37–39. 
 176. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(c)(1); id. § 77z-1(c)(1). 
 177. See id. § 78u-4(c)(2); id. § 77z-1(c)(2). 
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award of attorneys’ fees and costs in the event of a Rule 11 violation.178 According 
to the legislative history, these provisions were necessary to strengthen the 
deterrence against the filing of “meritless” or “abusive” litigation.179 
It is possible, of course, that Congress intended these provisions to be directed 
solely at frivolous, but not meritless, claims. But given that Congress legislated 
beyond the goal of giving more teeth to Rule 11, this likely only tells part of the 
story. It is more likely, given the legislative history, that Congress intended to treat 
frivolous and meritless cases the same. Pleading rules that derail a likely loser early 
on, class action provisions that magnify the scrutiny of plaintiffs and their counsel 
and limit the recovery of named plaintiffs, discovery rules that limit costs necessary 
to defend insubstantial claims, and damages provisions that make it more difficult 
to recover all have the effect of both limiting the burden of meritless claims and, to 
some extent, redefining the meaning of merit itself. That these new rules also 
appear to have made it more difficult to bring meritorious claims only heightens the 
extent to which legislative perception of the need to regulate frivolousness has 
broad and undesirable consequences.180 
3. Antitrust Litigation 
Antitrust is another substantive area in which frivolous and meritless litigation is 
often conflated. Courts are suspicious that run-of-the mill fraud or contract claims 
are sometimes framed as antitrust violations, because of the availability of treble 
damages that can lead to coerced settlements.181 Indeed, the Court has explicitly 
linked the imposition of heightened pleading in all antitrust claims to the concern 
about groundless and frivolous litigation leading to coerced settlements.182 The 
                                                                                                                 
 
 178. See id. § 78u-4(c)(3); id. § 77z-1(c)(3). 
 179. H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 39–40. 
 180. See Choi, supra note 167, at 600. 
 181. See Unitherm Food Sys., Inc. v. Swift-Eckrich, Inc., 375 F.3d 1341, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 
2004) (“The line between antitrust claims and ordinary business tort and contract claims is 
not always clear.”), rev’d on other grounds, 546 U.S. 394 (2006); E. Food Servs., Inc. v. 
Pontifical Catholic Univ. Servs. Ass’n, 357 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2004) (“[A]ntitrust claims are 
concerned not with wrongs directed against the private interest of an individual business but 
with conduct that stifles competition.”); Doctor’s Hosp. of Jefferson, Inc. v. Se. Med. 
Alliance, Inc., 123 F.3d 301, 306 (5th Cir. 1997) (noting that standing doctrine serves goal of 
distinguishing ordinary tort and contract actions from true antitrust claims); Reisner v. 
General Motors Corp., 511 F. Supp. 1167, 1178 n.25 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (“Numerous cases are 
filed in the federal district courts attempting to make antitrust claims out of what are, at 
most, contract claims or fraud claims involving conduct between two parties.”); Bucher v. 
Shumway, 452 F. Supp. 1288, 1291–93 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (fixing the price of a particular 
securities purchase was not cognizable under the antitrust laws); Madison Fund, Inc. v. 
Charter Co., 406 F. Supp. 749, 751 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (antitrust laws “not designed to police 
the performance of private contracts”); Edward D. Cavanagh, Detrebling Antitrust Damages: 
An Idea Whose Time Has Come?, 61 TUL. L. REV. 777, 815 (1987) (arguing that the 
availability of treble damages for antitrust violations “encourages filing of claims which are 
at best marginal and at worst frivolous”). 
 182. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558 (2007); Dura Pharm., Inc. v. 
Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 347 (2005). 
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Court even has relied upon a desire not to undermine the PSLRA’s specific 
approach to securities litigation reform, when it refused to extend antitrust liability 
against underwriters who market and distribute IPOs.183 Similarly, the Court’s 
standing doctrine in antitrust cases can be linked to concerns about frivolous 
litigation in combination with a treble damages regime.184 
In addition, the Supreme Court has increasingly framed changes in substantive 
antitrust law—definitions of merit—as a response to perceived threats of frivolous 
and abusive litigation.185 Take the Court’s turn from per se rules in antitrust law to 
the rule of reason. On one account, the Court’s transition can be seen as an embrace 
of neoclassical economics and the Chicago School’s account that, in a competitive 
market, the false negatives that may increase under a rule of reason standard are 
less problematic than the false positives that are increased using a per se rule.186 On 
the other hand, the Court also has explicitly adverted to the high cost of discovery, 
                                                                                                                 
 
 183. See Credit Suisse Secs. (USA) LLC v. Billing, 551 U.S. 264, 284 (2007) (“We also 
note that Congress, in an effort to weed out unmeritorious securities lawsuits, has recently 
tightened the procedural requirements that plaintiffs must satisfy when they file those suits. 
To permit an antitrust lawsuit risks circumventing these requirements by permitting plaintiffs 
to dress what is essentially a securities complaint in antitrust clothing.”). 
 184. See Joseph F. Brodley, Antitrust Standing in Private Merger Cases: Reconciling 
Private Incentives and Public Enforcement Goals, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1, 23 n.88 (1995) 
(noting that predatory pricing plaintiffs “must overcome deliberately underinclusive liability 
rules”); Jean Wegman Burns, The Paradox of Antitrust and Lanham Act Standing, 42 UCLA 
L. REV. 47, 95 (1994) (“Current antitrust standing rules eliminate not only clearly spurious 
lawsuits; they also bar claims having potential merit and thereby permit some likely 
violations to escape prosecution.”); Daniel A. Crane, Technocracy and Antitrust, 86 TEX. L. 
REV. 1159, 1210 (2008) (“Often, concerns about the chilling effect of the treble-damages 
remedy and abusive private litigation influence the courts to implement underinclusive 
liability norms in private suits.”); Lemos, supra note 60, at 833–34 (tracing limitation of 
antitrust remedies to concern about incentives to sue created by treble damages provision); 
Christopher R. Leslie, The Role of Consumers in Walker Process Litigation, 13 SW. J.L. & 
TRADE AMERICAS 281, 301 (2007). 
 185. See, e.g., John B. McArthur & Thomas W. Paterson, The Effects of Monsanto, 
Matsushita, and Sharp on the Plaintiff’s Incentive to Sue, 23 CONN. L. REV. 333, 334 (1991) 
(“Much of the recent change in antitrust law has been built on the theoretical speculation of a 
few economists, lawyers, and judges that the world is filled with plaintiffs who bring 
frivolous antitrust lawsuits expecting to be handed a pot of gold by defendants terrified by 
the threat of treble damages.”). 
 186. See Amanda P. Reeves & Maurice E. Stucke, Behavioral Antitrust, 86 IND. L.J. 
1527, 1549–50 (2011); see also Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc. 551 U.S. 
877, 900 (2007) (relying on adherents of Chicago School to justify overruling Dr. Miles 
Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911), and substituting rule of 
reason for per se ban on vertical minimum-resale-price agreements); State Oil Co. v. Khan, 
522 U.S. 3, 15, 18 (1997) (abandoning per se ban on maximum resale price maintenance 
agreements because “a considerable body of scholarship” suggested such agreements 
advanced competition and provided “insufficient economic justification for per se 
invalidation” of those agreements); Joshua D. Wright, Overshot the Mark? A Simple 
Explanation of the Chicago School’s Influence on Antitrust, 5 COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 
189, 194 (2009) (book review) (arguing that Chicago School’s most significant impact has 
been on the per se rule of illegality). 
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the risk of coerced settlements, and a perception of increasingly frivolous litigation 
in antitrust.187 
These examples of prisoners’ rights, securities litigation, and antitrust are not 
exhaustive. RICO has been treated comparably to antitrust litigation by courts, 
wary that the treble damages provision proves too much of an incentive for novel 
and abusive litigation.188 Judges worry over the ability of plaintiffs to “exploit” the 
damages and attorneys’ fees provisions of RICO.189 As one appellate court noted, 
plaintiffs have attempted to put RICO to use in “novel––and often imaginative––
ways . . . in order to exploit RICO’s provisions for treble damages and attorney’s 
fees.”190 And courts accordingly construe RICO’s liability provisions strictly,191 
even as Congress instructed them to “liberally construe[]” the statute’s terms.192 
Similarly, many commentators view judicial hostility to employment 
discrimination litigation to reflect the perception that most such cases are weak or 
frivolous.193 Relatedly, both judges and lawyers tend to agree that a fair proportion 
of employment discrimination claims are unimportant or frivolous.194 Damages 
caps, such as those present in employment discrimination, are often justified by the 
perception of rampant frivolousness, but they tend to suppress litigation across the 
board.195 
                                                                                                                 
 
 187. See Leegin, 551 U.S. at 895; Reeves & Stucke, supra note 186, at 1550. 
 188. See Lemos, supra note 60, at 835. 
 189. See G. Robert Blakey & Scott D. Cessar, Equitable Relief Under Civil RICO: 
Reflections on Religious Technology Center v. Wollersheim: Will Civil RICO Be Effective 
Only Against White-Collar Crime?, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 526, 580 (1987) (arguing that 
the lower courts are “hostile to civil RICO” and that “[j]udicial efforts to narrow the scope of 
the statute continue largely unabated”); David Kurzweil, Criminal and Civil RICO: 
Traditional Canons of Statutory Interpretation and the Liberal Construction Clause, 30 
COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 41, 42, 45–46 (1996). 
 190. Doe v. Roe, 958 F.2d 763, 765 (7th Cir. 1992). 
 191. See Blakey & Cessar, supra note 189, at 580–90 & nn.230–39; Kurzweil, supra note 
189, at 70–77, 86–88. 
 192. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 904, 84 Stat. 922, 947. 
 193. See Michael Selmi, Why Are Employment Discrimination Cases So Hard to Win?, 
61 LA. L. REV. 555, 561–69 (2001) (arguing that judges wrongly perceive employment 
discrimination cases as meritless and that judicial hostility interferes with recovery for 
meritorious claims); Lemos, supra note 60, at 830–31 (discussing judicial hostility to 
employment discrimination cases as example of concern about prevalence of weak cases). 
To some extent, this may reflect concern about docket load. See, e.g., Theresa M. Beiner, 
The Misuse of Summary Judgment in Hostile Environment Cases, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 
71, 97–122 (1999) (arguing that courts have increased hostility to harassment cases brought 
under Title VII, in part because of an increase in filing of Title VII claims after 1991). 
 194. See EIGHTH CIRCUIT GEND. FAIRNESS TASK FORCE, FINAL REPORT & 
RECOMMENDATIONS (1997), reprinted in 31 CREIGHTON L. REV. 9, 72–73 (1997); see also 
Lee Reeves, Pragmatism over Politics: Recent Trends in Lower Court Employment 
Discrimination Jurisprudence, 73 MO. L. REV. 481, 508, 555–56 (2008) (offering data 
suggesting that judges have negative perceptions of discrimination claims). 
 195. See Anita Bernstein, Complaints, 32 MCGEORGE L. REV. 37, 44 (2000) (discussing 
reforms, such as caps on damages and arguing “that suppression of complaints is an 
important motive for their enactment”). 
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The examples used in this Subpart are disparate in many ways, but they reveal 
many overlapping assumptions about the relationship between frivolous and 
meritless litigation. First, there is a tendency to lump both categories of cases 
together, be it for pre-answer screening, adjudications of motions to dismiss, or 
substantive law. Second, when courts and legislators conflate the two kinds of 
cases, it is often because of an assumption that both categories are equally 
burdensome without offering any benefit. The goal of the rules discussed in this 
Subpart is to winnow the field to enable courts to focus on only those cases with 
actual merit. Third, most of the rules described in this Subpart—from the pre-
answer screening for claims by prisoners and poor persons to the general and 
subject-matter-specific pleading rules—are founded on the view that a complaint 
that fails to state a claim is meritless. The rules described here do not purport to 
distinguish between claims that fail because of an insufficient legal theory and 
those that fail because of inadequate factual allegation. 
III. THE VALUE OF MERITLESS LITIGATION 
I have offered a conception of meritless and frivolous litigation that 
distinguishes between the two, and I have also shown how judges and legislators 
often fail to make a similar distinction. The purpose of this Part is to show why we 
should care about the conflation I outlined in Part II. I begin by providing a broad 
framework for theorizing the value of meritless litigation, using some examples 
that demonstrate this framework in action. I conclude with a discussion of how the 
legal change discussed in Part II undermines the role that meritless litigation plays 
in creating value. It should be said that I focus here on the value of meritless 
litigation in an “internal” sense. That is, my goal is to articulate what meritless 
litigation contributes to the law, not to institutions outside of or intertwined with 
the law. For instance, it goes without saying that providing access to a judicial 
system for all litigants ensures social stability by providing an alternative to violent 
self-help. It might also enhance participation and faith in other social and political 
institutions, or provide litigants with an avenue to tell their stories to an unbiased 
listener. These are all important values, but they are not the focus of this Article. 
A. The Framework for Appreciating the Value of Meritless Litigation 
The value of meritless litigation can be conceptualized on many levels. First, 
some meritless litigation will result in development or clarification of the law, even 
if the plaintiff herself will not benefit. Civil rights litigation is the best example, but 
any common law system will develop in part on the shoulders of unsuccessful 
plaintiffs, leading to innovation and also providing stability. Take the development 
of Eighth Amendment law. Perhaps the most significant case involving conditions 
of confinement challenges by prisoners is Estelle v. Gamble,196 a case in which the 
plaintiff’s complaint was dismissed by the Supreme Court. It reflects the value of 
meritless litigation on two levels. First, Estelle announced a new legal standard for 
the treatment of prisoners, which has defined the contours of prisoners’ rights 
                                                                                                                 
 
 196. 429 U.S. 97 (1976). 
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litigation for the last forty years.197 Second, in finding that the prisoner’s claim did 
not meet that standard, Estelle marked the outer boundaries of the new 
constitutional framework.198 
This second aspect of Estelle may be more important than the first, because 
courts can announce new standards governing conduct in both meritorious and 
meritless cases. New standards bring with them uncertainty. But this instability is 
offset when decisions apply the new standard in a particular factual context. The 
value from concrete application is created in both meritorious and meritless cases. 
Thus, Estelle is significant for the legal innovation it announced and for the 
stability it created by cabining the reach of its new standard. 
Sometimes, meritless cases are necessary to the development of a doctrine. Take 
Wickard v. Filburn,199 the 1942 case that was a central figure in the dispute 
surrounding the constitutionality of the Affordable Care Act.200 In Wickard, Roscoe 
Filburn sought to enjoin enforcement of a federal law that regulated wheat 
production.201 To decide the case, the Court adopted an expansive view of 
Congress’s Commerce Clause power that has dominated the landscape ever since. 
Although the Court has recently shown some indications of limiting Wickard’s 
reach,202 this only heightens the importance of Wickard to providing Congress with 
predictable contours of the breadth of Commerce Clause power. And to the point of 
this Article, Wickard was a meritless case—Filburn lost, but the legal system was 
the beneficiary. 
We can see a similar role for meritless litigation in the development of the law 
of sex discrimination. Our modern understanding of the limitations imposed by the 
Equal Protection Clause on sex classifications is informed by a series of cases that 
began with Reed v. Reed and culminated in Craig v. Boren.203 By the end of this 
series, one could make two observations about the constitutionality of sex 
                                                                                                                 
 
 197. Id. at 103–04 (announcing “deliberate indifference” standard). 
 198. Id. at 105–07 (describing circumstances that failed to meet deliberate indifference 
standard and applying them to the complaint). 
 199. 317 U.S. 111 (1942). 
 200. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012); Adam Liptak, At 
Heart of Health Law Clash, a 1942 Case of a Farmer’s Wheat, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 2012, 
at A1. 
 201. 317 U.S. at 114–15. 
 202. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); United States v. Lopez, 514 
U.S. 549 (1995). But see Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005). 
 203. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (striking down statute that provided 
different drinking ages for men and women); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 
(1975) (striking down Social Security Act provision that differentiated based on sex of 
wage-earning spouse); Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975) (upholding preferences 
for women in Navy’s promotion system); Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974) 
(upholding classification based on pregnancy in California’s disability insurance program); 
Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974) (upholding state property tax exemption for widows 
but not widowers); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (striking down provision of 
military benefits statute that disfavored spouses of women service members); Reed v. Reed, 
404 U.S. 71 (1971) (rejecting sex classification in estate proceedings); see also Califano v. 
Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977) (sustaining preference for women in calculation of social 
security benefits). 
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classifications: first, intentional sex classifications would be judged under 
“intermediate scrutiny”; and second, the State would have more leeway to make 
classifications based on “inherent” and not stereotyped differences.204 But one 
would not be able to understand the meaning of these insights without both the 
meritorious and meritless cases. As just one example, we know that one “inherent” 
difference in gender that can form the basis of state regulation is past 
discrimination against women in the workplace, just as we know that a difference 
that cannot form the basis for regulation is a generalization about the bonds formed 
by mothers and fathers with their children.205 We know the former because of an 
unsuccessful challenge in Webster, and we know the latter because of a successful 
challenge in Caban. As regards development of the law, however, both the 
meritorious and meritless case has provided value. 
The value of meritless litigation to legal development is not limited to public 
law disputes. Tort and contract doctrine often have developed as a result of both 
meritorious and meritless litigation. Courts have used meritless litigation to mark 
the boundaries of duty of care in tort law, for example.206 Tort plaintiffs pursuing a 
public nuisance theory in novel cases such as lead poisoning and gun violence have 
charted a course guided by past failures, with varying degrees of success.207 This 
has led scholars and practitioners to consider adopting a similar strategy to address 
climate change.208 In contract law as well, legal development has been linked to 
past failures. The doctrine of promissory estoppel, for example, developed in part 
                                                                                                                 
 
 204. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531–34 (1996) (summarizing sex 
discrimination jurisprudence). 
 205. Compare Webster, 430 U.S. 313, with Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979). 
 206. In California, for instance, seven cases announced over a period of about sixty years 
clarified a property owner’s duty of care to third parties. See King v. Lennen, 348 P.2d 98 
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liability); Reynolds v. Willson, 331 P.2d 48 (Cal. 1958) (finding liability); Knight v. Kaiser 
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 207. Compare, e.g., Camden Cnty. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders v. Beretta, U.S.A. Corp., 
273 F.3d 536, 539 (3d Cir. 2001) (rejecting public nuisance theory as applied to handgun 
manufacturers), Tioga Pub. Sch. Dist. v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 984 F.2d 915, 920 (8th Cir. 
1993) (rejecting nuisance theory pursued against asbestos manufacturers), and Detroit Bd. of 
Educ. v. Celotex Corp., 493 N.W.2d 513, 521 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992) (same), with Cnty. of 
Santa Clara v. Atl. Richfield Co., 40 Cal. Rptr. 3d 313 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006) (accepting 
public nuisance theory brought against lead paint manufacturers), and City of Bos. v. Smith 
& Wesson Corp., No. 199902590, 2000 WL 1473568, at *14 (Mass. Super. Ct. July 13, 
2000) (accepting public nuisance theory for handgun manufacturers); see also George L. 
Priest, Market Share Liability in Personal Injury and Public Nuisance Litigation: An 
Economic Analysis, 18 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 109, 121–24 (2010) (criticizing use of public 
nuisance theory). 
 208. See, e.g., David A. Grossman, Warming Up to a Not-So-Radical Idea: Tort-Based 
Climate Change Litigation, 28 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 56–57 (2003). 
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because some claims were rejected through rigid application of the consideration 
requirement,209 and the doctrine of substantial performance emerged to ameliorate 
the constructive conditions doctrine.210 One can trace numerous developments in 
contract law through a common-law response to market conditions, changed social 
dynamics, and perceived inadequacies of the status quo doctrine.211 
Second, in addition to helping develop the law, some meritless litigation will 
prompt more direct change in the law. The very fact that the litigation is 
unsuccessful may be perceived as a problem to be fixed. The most recent example 
of this is found in the legislative response to Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber 
Co.212 In Ledbetter, the Supreme Court rejected the employee’s Title VII pay 
disparity case on statute of limitations grounds, holding that each paycheck 
constituted a discriminatory act that must be subjected to Title VII exhaustion 
within the period mandated by statute.213 The Court rested its decision in part on a 
1977 decision, United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans,214 offering that “[i]t would be 
difficult [for Evans] to speak to the point more directly.”215 Thus, Ledbetter can 
safely be classified as a meritless case. Yet it provoked significant legal change. 
Within two years, Congress had passed and the President had signed the Lilly 
Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, legislatively overruling the Court’s decision.216 
The Civil Rights Act of 1991217 and the Pregnancy Discrimination Act218 similarly 
provide examples of a legislative response to court decisions rendering meritless 
litigation that the political branches deem to have merit.219 
                                                                                                                 
 
 209. See Lawrence A. Cunningham, Cardozo and Posner: A Study in Contracts, 36 WM. 
& MARY L. REV. 1379, 1405 (1995); Nathan B. Oman, Consent to Retaliation: A Civil 
Recourse Theory of Contractual Liability, 96 IOWA L. REV. 529, 574 (2011). 
 210. See Boone v. Eyre, (1777) 126 Eng. Rep. 160 (K.B.) (recognizing the need for 
substantial performance four years after prior case establishing constructive conditions); 
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 212. 550 U.S. 618 (2007). 
 213. Id. at 624–26. 
 214. 431 U.S. 553 (1977). 
 215. Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 626. 
 216. See Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5 (amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(e)). 
 217. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071. 
 218. Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978) (codified at 42 U.S.C. 2000e(k) (2006)). 
 219. The Civil Rights Act was a response to several decisions. See Equal Emp’t 
Opportunity Comm’n v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244 (1991) (holding that Title VII 
does not apply extraterritorially to United States employers); Patterson v. McLean Credit 
Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989) (interpreting 42 U.S.C. § 1981 not to bar racial discrimination in 
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One could run on with these examples. The Americans with Disabilities Act, for 
instance, was in part a legislative response to the failure of federal and state courts 
to provide adequate protection for individuals with disabilities.220 In other words, 
the ADA stepped in to make meritorious what courts had previously deemed 
meritless. Moreover, after the Supreme Court interpreted the ADA narrowly to 
exclude many individuals from coverage,221 Congress responded once again with 
amendments.222 The path to Brown v. Board of Education is littered with cases in 
which courts adhered to Plessy v. Ferguson’s “separate but equal” doctrine.223 But 
where the litigation strategy embraced education of the judiciary as the goal, even 
with losses along the way, change has the potential to emerge.224 As Judge Robert 
Carter has stated, “I have no doubt that the Supreme Court’s opportunity to 
pronounce separate schools inherently unequal [in Brown v. Board of Education] 
would have been delayed for a decade had my colleagues and I been required, upon 
pain of potential sanctions, to plead our legal theory explicitly from the start.”225 
Third, even if meritless litigation does not achieve formal legal change, it may 
play an important role in a discussion of proper institutional conduct and behavior. 
Lesley Wexler has recently argued that legal challenges to the Obama 
Administration’s decision to target Anwar al-Aulaqi, although unsuccessful, have 
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 225. 151 CONG. REC. H9286 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 2005) (alteration in original). 
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served several important purposes.226 Although failing on the immediate goals of 
challenging the Administration’s decision, Wexler argues that the litigation 
provoked a public debate about the limits of the war on terror, initiated scrutiny of 
legal and policy decisions that the Administration has recently felt compelled to 
respond to,227 and arguably created more transparency. Similarly, one might argue 
that the ongoing litigation alleging that law schools falsified employment data, while 
unlikely to succeed on the merits, has increased pressure on law schools and 
regulatory bodies to provide better information to prospective applicants. And one 
can look back to nineteenth-century litigators bringing uniformly unsuccessful 
challenges regarding slavery and women’s suffrage to see the value of using 
litigation to generate public debate and ultimately legal change.228 
I have focused much of my discussion to this point on Supreme Court precedent, 
which might strike some as misleading. Most meritless litigation does not reach the 
Court’s doors, and cases selected by the Court for disposition are more likely to 
resolve important and disputed legal principles. But meritless litigation plays much 
the same role in lower court opinions as well. Thus, to the extent that lower courts 
play a role in drawing the boundaries of constitutional doctrine, meritless litigation 
can be extremely important.229 This is the case even for lower courts resolving issues 
of common law tort liability230 and for cases involving statutory interpretation.231 
Indeed, it might be argued that meritless cases are even more important for the 
development and application of law in the lower courts than in the Supreme Court. 
There are many more cases to resolve, and lower courts have more precedent to 
adhere to, making the guidance offered by meritless cases particularly critical.  
Meritless litigation can also produce stability. Outside of the legal system, if the 
procedure for resolving disputes is perceived as fair and neutral, losers will be less 
likely to resort to disruptive self-help.232 Within the legal system, meritless cases 
mark the outer boundary of success. Parties who have to decide how to resolve 
disputes—running the gamut from arbitration, to settlement, or trial—rely on both 
meritorious and meritless cases to guide their decision making. In this sense, 
meritless litigation is part of the stable foundation to our legal system. 
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 230. See, e.g., Johnson v. A/S Ivarans Rederi, 613 F.2d 334, 341 (1st Cir. 1980) (reviewing 
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B. Barriers to Obtaining Value from Meritless Cases 
Many theorists have recognized that litigation is about more than simply the 
resolution of a dispute between two private parties. Abram Chayes introduced the 
term “public law” to refer to litigation that is directed toward broad, systemic, and 
transformative goals.233 Owen Fiss and Judith Resnik have found a similar role for 
legal process in elaborating public values.234 Embracing this role of litigation 
“assumes a procedural system hospitable to debate about the existence, scope, and 
enforcement of public rights” and “rejects as unrealistically limited the traditional 
model’s focus on private dispute resolution.”235 In other words, for litigation to play 
this role we must have a procedural system that tolerates failure. If this increases 
burdens on courts and even institutional defendants, it is worth the deterrence and 
deliberative value.236 Even courts have at times recognized the nonadjudicative 
value of litigation as a source of information that can prompt a discussion about 
governmental action.237 As has been discussed, these values are not necessarily 
limited to classic public law litigation.238 
The focus on efficiency that characterizes judicial and legislative conflation of 
meritless and frivolous litigation conflicts with this public law approach to 
litigation. It fails to acknowledge the contributions that litigation can make to 
empowering disfavored groups, encouraging deliberation about public values, and 
enhancing justice in the court system.239 In a traditional focus on efficiency and 
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cost reduction, “[t]he implicit message is that meritorious claims belong in the 
system; those that appear likely to fail do not.”240 
Even those who believe that the purpose of adjudication is limited to ensuring 
that meritorious claims are adjudicated correctly have recognized the failings of 
some of the changes discussed in Part II. Changes in pleading doctrine that 
emphasize “plausibility” may prematurely (and incorrectly) categorize a 
meritorious claim as meritless.241 Even if these changes do not result in inaccurate 
filtering, they may deter the filing of meritorious claims.242 Changes in summary 
judgment have prompted some of the same concerns.243 And some of the subject 
matter specific changes, in the PSLRA and PLRA among others, have also been 
criticized for failing to accurately filter out frivolous and meritless cases at the 
correct procedural moment.244 
Moreover, the judicial doctrine and legislative enactments that have been 
influenced by a conflation of meritless with frivolous litigation have a significant 
impact on the role that meritless litigation can play in the legal universe. Some of 
the connections are obvious. To the extent that Congress has equated frivolous and 
meritless litigation in the PLRA’s three-strikes and exhaustion provisions, it 
directly interferes with the filing of all categories of cases. But most of the 
developments discussed in Part II have a less direct connection to the problem 
described in this Article. In part this is because many of the legal rules adopted by 
courts and legislatures affect the timing at which cases are adjudicated. Most of the 
doctrine and statutory enactments introduced as a result of the conflation between 
frivolous and meritless emphasizes final disposition as early as possible in a civil 
case’s life span. But the earlier that a meritless case is dismissed, the less likely that 
it will create value for the legal system because early dismissals will tend to be less 
informed decisions to dismiss. 
Additionally, to the extent that judicial and legislative responses have made it 
difficult to proceed with meritless litigation past the motion to dismiss stage, it 
                                                                                                                 
 
 240. Id. at 402; see also Bone, supra note 24, at 882–83 (noting that allowing cases to 
proceed on the theory that discovery may reveal useful information is insufficient because 
the investigation that occurs in discovery is not the “purpose of adjudication”). 
 241. See Bone, supra note 24, at 878–79 (describing problem with Iqbal standard as 
screening out meritorious cases, “even ones with a high probability of trial success but a 
probability that is not evident at the pleading stage before access to discovery”); Miller, 
supra note 22, at 28 (“Iqbal may eliminate a range of arguably weak but potentially 
meritorious cases, not merely meritless actions.”); Alexander A. Reinert, The Costs of 
Heightened Pleading, 86 IND. L.J. 119 (2011) (presenting data suggesting that Iqbal and 
Twombly will be poor filters for merit); Spencer, supra note 24, at 432, 481 (criticizing 
Twombly for permitting dismissal prior to discovery, which might show whether a particular 
claim is meritorious or “frivolous or nonmeritorious”). 
 242. See Miller, supra note 22, at 71–77 (discussing concern that Iqbal and Twombly will 
deter filing or enforcement of meritorious public law claims, which have an important 
regulatory and deterrent effect). 
 243. See Samuel Issacharoff & George Loewenstein, Second Thoughts About Summary 
Judgment, 100 YALE L.J. 73, 75 (1990) (“[L]iberalized summary judgment inhibits the filing 
of otherwise meritorious suits and results in a wealth transfer from plaintiffs as a class to 
defendants as a class.”). 
 244. See Choi, supra note 167, at 602. 
2014] SCREENING OUT INNOVATION 1233 
 
prevents litigants from engaging in the kind of factual discovery that can prompt 
future changes in legal rules.245 Moreover, as cases are dismissed at earlier and 
earlier procedural stages, the announcement of relevant legal rules inevitably will 
be more generalized and less tailored to specific factual scenarios, thus depriving 
future litigants of meaningful guidance. And, of course, to the extent that litigants 
are subjected to the same sanctions for both frivolous and meritless litigation, it 
heightens the perception that nothing is to be gained by either. 
To make some of these concerns more concrete, I will use the Court’s decision 
in Iqbal as an example, but the problems I identify are equally applicable to any 
heightened pleading regime.246 Recall that in Iqbal, the first principle offered by 
the Court was that “conclusory” factual allegations should be discarded at the 
motion to dismiss stage. In Iqbal, this meant that the Court could disregard the 
allegation that the defendants intentionally treated the plaintiff differently on 
account of his race, religion, and national origin. Had the Court credited those 
allegations, it would have had to confront the difficult question posed by Iqbal: 
namely, whether the circumstances of September 11 and its aftermath would 
justify the differential treatment challenged in that case. Instead, by construing 
the complaint absent those critical allegations, the Court failed to resolve an 
important constitutional question that could guide officials, litigants, and courts 
in the future. 
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As a second example, take the Court’s plausibility analysis, which calls upon 
courts to use their “judicial experience and common sense” to determine the 
sufficiency of a complaint. By liberating courts to dismiss complaints on these 
grounds, Iqbal may function to make 12(b)(6) dismissals sui generis, thereby 
depriving courts and litigants of the predictability and stability that meritless 
litigation has provided in the past. 
The qualified immunity doctrine functions in a different way to prevent 
meritless litigation from providing value. First, qualified immunity plays a large 
role in case selection. If plaintiffs’ lawyers are risk averse,247 they will choose cases 
in which qualified immunity plays a limited role in case resolution.248 The result 
may be that the vast majority of constitutional damages cases never test the limits 
of existing law, because the attorneys who file them select cases that are within the 
“clearly established” zone that will defeat a qualified immunity defense.249 
Second, as suggested in Part II, the order by which courts resolve the 
questions presented by the qualified immunity defense also will affect the extent 
to which meritless litigation can shape the law. If courts dismiss cases because 
the law was not clearly established at the time of an alleged violation, 
constitutional law will remain static. John Jeffries has argued that qualified 
immunity permits courts to engage in legal innovation,250 but this proposition will 
not hold if cases are routinely dismissed after courts only answer the clearly 
established law question.251 
CONCLUSION 
It is somewhat surprising that courts and academics overlook the value of 
litigant failure. After all, judges routinely issue dissents in cases, presumably 
because they believe there is some benefit to articulating their own rejected 
position. Dissents have been said to act as a counterweight to the majority opinion, 
“keeping the majority accountable for the rationale and consequences of its 
decision” and providing guidance to future courts and litigants about how to limit 
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the reach of the majority opinion.252 And some, of course, chart the course for an 
eventual change in the law.253 
Meritless litigation does not rise to the level of a dissent, but it may serve similar 
values. Like dissents, meritless litigation can mark the boundaries of established 
law, prompt legal change, or provoke a broader discussion of legal norms. But 
meritless litigation is undervalued by judges and legislators, leading to significant 
developments in statutory enactments and judicial doctrine. 
It is worth taking a moment to consider what it might mean to better recognize 
the distinction between frivolous and meritless litigation. Some answers are 
obvious: the PLRA’s three-strikes provision and prescreening provision should be 
revised to eliminate the conflation of frivolous and meritless suits; pleading 
doctrine should be focused on traditional measures of legal insufficiency and not 
the factual inquiry that Iqbal and Twombly may suggest. 
Other answers may be more controversial. Incentivizing all meritless litigation 
might not be justified, because although it provides value it also incurs costs. But 
the specific category of meritless litigation created by qualified immunity may 
justify closer consideration. For instance, if attorneys’ fees were available for 
plaintiffs who showed that their rights were violated, even though the rights were 
not clearly established, it might incentivize attorneys to represent litigants in the 
“gray” area of constitutional litigation. This model is not foreign to civil rights 
litigation—in mixed-motive employment discrimination cases, plaintiffs who 
prevail are not entitled to compensatory damages but may be awarded other relief, 
including attorneys’ fees.254 And the Supreme Court has recognized that attorneys’ 
fees in civil rights litigation may far exceed a plaintiff’s compensatory award 
because it is important to encourage the vindication of constitutional rights even 
when doing so is economically inefficient.255 By the same token, it would be unfair 
to ask a defendant to bear the costs of a plaintiff’s unsuccessful litigation; it may be 
necessary to create court-operated funds to provide such incentives. 
Notably, Congress has recognized the need to incentivize meritless litigation in 
patent disputes. The Hatch-Waxman Act encourages generic drug manufacturers to 
challenge the validity of existing pharmaceutical patents, on the theory that it will 
result in speedier production of cheaper generic versions of brand-name 
pharmaceuticals. Through what is known as a “Paragraph IV” filing, the first 
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generic drug manufacturer who brings such a challenge is entitled to a 180-day 
exclusivity period wherein the challenging manufacturer has the sole right to 
market the generic version of the drug.256 The challenger is the beneficiary of the 
180-day exclusivity period even if there is no merit to its claim of patent invalidity. 
As one commentator has noted, the Paragraph IV filing “changes the ordinary risk 
calculus for patent litigation”—the challenger need not worry over being sued for 
damages for patent infringement, but stands to gain significantly from being the 
first to file a challenge.257 At the same time, Congress believed that encouraging 
such suits would spark innovation among brand-name manufacturers who will 
create new drugs at a faster pace.258 
Even if incentivizing meritless litigation is not in the cards outside of 
pharmaceutical production, it remains essential that courts and legislators take 
greater care in translating assumptions about the relative value of frivolous and 
meritless litigation into doctrine and statutes. Recognizing the value of meritless 
litigation will not always translate into adopting procedural rules that permit such 
litigation to proceed to discovery and trial. As I have shown in this paper, how we 
adjudicate cases can be as important as when we adjudicate them. Even if, for 
instance, courts continue to dismiss many meritless cases at the pleading stage, 
courts may leverage whatever value such cases have by adjusting how they resolve 
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them. Providing more specificity in judgments at the motion to dismiss stage will 
provide more clarity and guidance in the law as we move forward. Similarly, 
changing how we resolve claims of qualified immunity can benefit our legal system 
even if it does not change the outcome of cases in which the defense is raised. 
Refusing to acknowledge the distinct value of meritless litigation, by contrast, 
measures litigation solely by the outcome it achieves for the parties to the dispute—
litigation that does not change the status quo is a failure on this account. If we 
expect our legal system to continue to evolve and adapt, however, this kind of 
failure must be tolerated, even if not embraced. 
